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ABSTRACT
This dissertation seeks to understand and study the process of attention harvesting
and knowledge production on typical online Q&A communities. Goals of this study
include quantifying the attention harvesting and online knowledge, damping the effect
of competition for attention on knowledge production, and examining the diversity
of user behaviors on question answering. Project 1 starts with a simplistic discrete
time model on a scale-free network and provides the method to measure the attention
harvested. Further, project 1 highlights the effect of distractions on harvesting pro-
ductive attention and in the end concludes which factors are influential and sensitive
to the attention harvesting. The main finding is the critical condition to optimize the
attention harvesting on the network by reducing network connection. Project 2 ex-
tends the scope of the study to quantify the value and quality of knowledge, focusing
on the question answering dynamics. This part of research models how attention was
distributed under typical answering strategies on a virtual online Q&A community.
The final result provides an approach to measure the efficiency of attention transferred
into value production and observes the contribution of different scenarios under var-
ious computed metrics. Project 3 is an advanced study on the foundation of the
virtual question answering community from project 2. With highlights of different
user behavioral preferences, algorithm stochastically simulates individual decisions
and behavior. Results from sensitivity analysis on different mixtures of user groups
gives insight of nonlinear dynamics for the objectives of success. Simulation finding
shows reputation rewarding mechanism on Stack Overflow shapes the crowd mixture
of behavior to be successful. In addition, project proposed an attention allocation
scenario of question answering to improve the success metrics when coupling with a
particular selection strategy.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Crowdsourcing
We have entered a new era with the advent of global internet and the ease of
high speed information sharing. The traditional pattern of knowledge propagating
and preserving shifts. For examples companies like Digg, YouTube, Stack Exchange
and Wikipedia successfully establish. YouTube with millions of users contributes
to roughly 37% of all downstream traffic on the mobile internet as of March 20191.
Creation and uploading videos is one typical way of crowdsourcing through YouTube
but the phenomenon of crowdsourcing can be extended to engage a huge crowd to
practice on a common goal of providing answers, ideas and solutions. The reasons
of people participating crowdsourcing are getting attention, recognition or financial
gain. No matter which intention they possess, the final product of crowdsourcing is
a public good which is non-excludable and nonrivalrous(Bade and Parkin, 2007). It
characterizes in two ways that this good can be acquired by anyone for free whenever
needed and its consumption by others does not affect how much left for others.
1.2 Attention Harvesting
Cognitive surplus refers to the energy and spare time that individuals have above
and beyond satisfying the daily necessities of life and can spend on voluntary activi-
ties(Shirky, 2010). Democratic surplus is a component of cognitive surplus which is
1”YouTube Usage Comprises 37% Of All Mobile Web Traffic, Study Finds”, Geoff Weiss, Tube-
filter.com, https://www.tubefilter.com/2019/03/27/youtube-37-percent-all-mobile-traffic/
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the ”effort, goodwill, expertise, innovation and leadership” that individuals possess
and can voluntarily exercise within their spare time and energy(Kelley and Johnston,
2012). During crowdsourcing activities, people devote their capacities of cognitive
surplus and democratic surplus into production of public good. During our study,
we refer the cognitive surplus and democratic surplus spent on online communities of
knowledge as attention and online communities of knowledge trying to attract more
attention from people as attention harvesting which redeems attention as a renewable
resource and can be harvested from people.
1.2.1 Online Communities of Knowledge
Online communities of knowledge as the main focus of our research refer to the
platforms of internet-enabled collective intelligence, whereby large crowd from diverse
backgrounds disregarding the vast geographic ranges can willingly collect and trans-
form numbers of tiny contributions into meaningful good for the world(Brabham,
2008). Typical examples of online communities are internet encyclopedia Wikipedia,
question and answering site Stack Exchange(https://stackexchange.com/) and code
sharing platform GitHub(https://github.com/).
We conduct the research and modeling based on Stack Exchange type of online
community. This is a pull system of question and answering site that people can
search and choose the interested questions to answer and view. Individual is actively
”pulling” the interested topics out from the site instead of topics being recommended
to users or ”pushed” by the system. News aggregator site Digg(www.digg.com) is
an example of another type of online community with a push system. In latest 2019
statistics of Stack Exchange (https://stackexchange.com/about), there are 50.7 mil-
lion unique visitors monthly and total 9.6 billion of pageviews. The total registered
users is about 9.5 million. The Stack Exchange network consists of 133 Q&A com-
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munities including its flagsite Stack Overflow. Stack Overflow alone serves more than
50 million developers every month.
Stack Overflow’s success shall credit to its reputation and privilege system. Users
get awarded for reputation score by asking good questions and providing good an-
swers. Awarding process will distribute different reputation scores whenever there
is someone voting up or accepting the answer. Higher reputation score will unlock
levels of privilege. Users with corresponding privilege can tip the good questions and
answers by voting up and voting down for bad answers as reputation punishment. Be-
sides the good awarding mechanism to stimulate contribution and engagement, Stack
Overflow also have linked related question, duplicate and similar questions together
and formed a question hierarchy so that users can easily see and explore related topics
with similar interest.
1.2.2 Other Ways of Attention Harvesting
Other major approaches to harvest people’s attention will be advertisement and
online competition. Advertisement is very common and widely used to populate
information for monetary intention. As matter of fact, it is a low-efficient way to
harvest attention. As reported in 20182, clickthrough rate across all ad formats and
placements display ad is just 0.05%. Furthermore as far as I know the attention
harvested by advertisement didn’t directly produce public good which differentiate
itself from other approaches of harvesting.
For online competitions, multiplayer online game Foldit and Netflix Prize for best
movie recommendation are two well-known and successful examples. The online game
2”US, Europe and Worldwide display ad clickthrough rates statistics summary”, Dave Chaf-
fey https://www.smartinsights.com/internet-advertising/internet-advertising-analytics/display-
advertising-clickthrough-rates/
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Foldit allows players to collaborate and compete to find out the accurate protein
structure. Surprisingly algorithm developed by Foldit players outperforms previously
published methods and shows striking similarity to unrevealed and independent work
by scientists(Khatib et al., 2011). In order to improve costumers’ satisfaction to the
recommended movies, Netflix awarded one million grand prize started in 2006 to find
the best algorithm of recommendation system based on costumers’ preference. Netflix
Prize (https://www.netflixprize.com/) motivated fast growing for the field of machine
learning. The creation of new recommendation algorithms also benefits to solve other
problems.
1.3 Why is Studying the Attention Harvesting and Public Good Production
Process so Important?
The emergence of participatory platforms of crowdsourcing brings many potential
opportunities in legitimacy, government, information technology and network society
sectors to enlighten, engage and empower the public democratic surplus. While many
initiatives have established to maximize the opportunities, encourage civic participa-
tion and transit from government to governance, underlying problems like regulation
on public good being created and resource management of democratic surplus become
critical and urgent. As limited and renewable resource, our attention is uneasy to
harvest and become democratic surplus after surviving from distractions in daily life
and work. We shall spend this surplus wisely and efficiently. Therefore understanding
the process of harvesting attention and transmission into production of public good
becomes so important to be able to efficiently utilize this civic resource and maxi-
mize the social null. The study brings insight of production process and helps policy
maker, government and platform organizers more effectively and efficiently direct the
crowdsourcing power into the most needed and beneficial place.
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1.4 Projects Outline
Dissertation tries to understand and study the process of attention harvesting
and knowledge production on typical online Q&A communities. Goals of this study
include quantifying the attention harvesting. In project 1, we start with a simplistic
discrete time model on a scale-free network and provide the method to measure the
attention harvested. Further project 1 highlights the effect of distractions on harvest-
ing productive attention and in the end concludes which factors are influential and
sensitive to the attention harvesting. In project 2, we extend the scope to quantify
the value and quality of knowledge with focus on the questions answering dynam-
ics. We model how attention was distributed under typical answering strategy on
a virtual network of online Q&A community. While questions are being answered,
quality and value are computed. The final result provides approach to measure the
efficiency of attention transferred into value production and examine the contribu-
tion of different scenarios under various computed metrics. For the project 3, it is
an advanced study on the foundation of virtual question answering community from
project 2. With highlights of modeling different user types, behaviors and preferences,
we stochastically simulate individual decision and behavior. Our work investigates
the contribution by each user strategies and perform sensitivity analysis on different
mixture of user groups.
1.4.1 Project 1:Harvesting Attention to Produce Knowledge under Distractions
Nowadays fragmentation of attention becomes an urgent problem3. How would
this affect the online knowledge production and crowdsourcing behavior? This study
3”Multitasking: Focus and Dispersion in the Age of FOMO”, NURUN
https://www.nurun.com/en/our-thinking/emerging-behavior/multitasking-focus-and-dispersion-in-
the-age-of-fomo/
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about question and answer community (QAC) models the dynamics of attention
harvested into knowledge production and build on top of the scale-free social network
generated from empirical study. Sensitivity analysis is performed to find the most
critical and sensitive parameters in the model and network structure shows little effect
on final amount of attention harvested. Further simulation result shows there is a
conditional optimum by reducing network linkage from question to question. The
condition of result is depended on the likelihood of staying at the system when being
given less number of attractive choices.
1.4.2 Project 2: Return On Assets of Attention Harvesting for Knowledge
Production
We look into the measurement of efficiency for attention harvesting and knowl-
edge production and we also care about the effect of typical answering strategies on
overall community performance. The economic concept of Return On Assets(ROA)
is adapted to estimate the return of value from devoting attention into answering
question. This research constructs the virtual environment of online question and
answers community and simulate attention distribution to answer questions under
two answering strategy groups identified by previous studies. The preliminary find-
ing shows distinct contribution patterns between two strategy groups on the overall
questions answered percentage, average quality and value across the community. In
sum, group in favor of difficult questions to answer contributes high quality and high
value questions but overshoots the questions with too many answers and thus less
value per answer, while group in favor of easy questions to answer helps improve the
overall question answered percentage and contributes to the most of mid-level quality
and value questions.
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1.4.3 Project 3: How Behavior of Users Impacts The Success of Online Q&A
Communities
What makes Question & Answer (Q&A) communities productive? In this arti-
cle we look how diversity of behavioral types of agents impact the performance of
Q&A communities using different performance metrics. We do this by developing an
agent-based model informed by insights from previous studies on Q&A communities.
By analyzing different strategies for how questions are selected and answered we find
that there mixtures of strategies leading to best outcomes for different performance
conditions. Nevertheless, Q&A communities that reward participants to focus on
answering the new questions have the best performance in answering questions, im-
proving quality and solving difficult tasks, which is in line with observed outcome. In
conclusion we find that the current strategies of Q&A answers are in line with high
performance of producing public benefit from the collective attention available.
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Chapter 2
HARVESTING ATTENTION TO PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE UNDER
DISTRACTIONS
2.1 Introduction
Attention is becoming an expensive commodity due to intense competition for our
attention in low cost ways. A well-connected digital world and the internet appropri-
ate our attention by showing abundant and fast-producing content online. Long and
continuous focus on one task becomes extremely rare1. Typical online behaviors are
either engaging a serial of shifting from task to task or multitasking. Both behaviors
characterize the fragmentation of attention which has been studied to be significant
on mobile devices under various environmental distractions(Oulasvirta, 2005). Frag-
mentation of attention is not beneficial to complete tasks and be productive on the
online knowledge producing communities like Stack Exchange, Wikipedia and so on.
Understanding the dispersion of attention under influence from over-redundant and
distracted content becomes critical because crowdsourcing is an emerging trend nowa-
days. A measurement for the cost of online knowledge producing can help to improve
efficiency and better utilize the power of crowdsouring.
This study aims at modeling the attention harvesting on online Q&A communities
and puts particular interest in attention dispersion under distraction of multiple linked
topics and contents. We investigate the cost of knowledge production and hope
1”Multitasking: Focus and Dispersion in the Age of FOMO”,NURUN
https://www.nurun.com/en/our-thinking/emerging-behavior/multitasking-focus-and-dispersion-in-
the-age-of-fomo/
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to provide insight of operations efficiency for developers and organizers of online
communities. The study on attention dispersion under effect of fragmentation of
attention provides insight and motive for research interest in the chapter 4 while we
are looking into users answering strategy of attention allocation.
Wang et al. (2016); Wu and Janssen (2015) find Q&A communities similar to our
topic of interest follow typical scale-free networks. The scale-free network follows the
critical rule of power-law distribution of edges and nodes(Baraba´si and Bonabeau,
2003). Our implementation of generating a scale-free network to study is mixing of
preferential attachment and reversed preferential attachment(Wu and Janssen, 2015).
Our model is a difference model of discrete time system and time spent at each node
as residences’ ages are recorded and labeled into discrete stages. With empirical
studies(Rutz and Bucklin, 2012; Nair, 2010; Kim et al., 2011; Park, 2017; Huberman
et al., 1998; Liu et al., 2010) on distribution of user behaviors through time, we
look into final steady status of the network and define an objective function about
harvested attention for production to observe.
We perform sensitivity analysis on important model parameters. One of the find-
ings is that the probability of exiting the network is the most sensitive factor to
impact the value of pre-defined objective function, which is measuring the weighted
sum of population on the network. The mixing relation between preferential attach-
ment and reversed preferential attachment only determines the network structure but
has no impact on the objective function of harvested attention. Further we investi-
gate the effect of distraction by optimally removing edges from the network. Finding
shows taking out selected edges from a standard genetic algorithm optimization will
maximize the value of our objective function until an optimum of objective func-
tion is reached after that objective function is decreasing. The optimum of objective
function conditions on optimal network connection from genetic algorithm. Such an
9
optimum would not exist if the likelihood of staying at the original node decreases
below a threshold. A parameter called stickiness factor captures the dynamics of this
likelihood and show this threshold is close to value of 0.7. When value of stickiness
factor is 0.7, people who would have switched to a removed node will now have an
alternative probability of staying at current node with the value of 70% of original
staying probability. Decisions are made at every 10 seconds in the model.
2.2 Model and Method
We are interested in how much attention is harvested on the network. In our model
the assumption is that attention is time spent on the network. We keep tracking the
users population and how much time they spend on the network in the model. Let
Pi(t, a) be the population of users at node i, time t and residence’s age a. Time spent
on each node is recorded and labeled into discrete time stages called residence’s age.
Each topic of interest or question here is referred as node. Linkages between topics
and questions are edges on the virtual network. The total number of nodes in the
network is N . The time period we study is 500 seconds in total which is relatively
short compared to the period of network development and question creation. We
consider the problem as a fixed network and not growing. The total number of age
bins is K.

Pi(t+ 1, 1) = λi + siir(1− c)Pi(t, 1) +
∑K
a=1
∑N
j 6=i sjir(1− c)Pj(t, a) for a = 1
Pi(t+ 1, a) = siir(1− c)Pi(t, a) + r · cPi(t, a− 1) for a > 1
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Table 2.1: List of Parameters
Parameter Description
λi Newly arrived population from out of the network to node i
sij Switching probability from node i to j
r Probability of individual did not leaving the system
c Aging proportion at residence’s age bin a
Figure 2.1: Model Flowchart
Pi(t, 1) is population at node i and residence’s age bin 1 and progressing in se-
quence to residence’s age bins 2, 3, 4 and so on. Aging population at each time step
t is a proportion c of whole population. Aging proportion parameter c depends on
the lengths of the age bins L that c = 1/L. In out study the length L = 10 so that
c = 0.1. Equally, we group all the actions within a 10-sec bin. As shown in the
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model flowchart, when users switch a topic of interest and move to a new node, the
corresponding residence’s age is reset and start counting from the beginning at bin 1.
Let ~P ∗(a) be the column vector of the final population at steady state for all
the nodes at residence’s age bin a. Row element of vector ~P ∗(a) is the final steady
population at each node. Let S be the N×N matrix of all the transmission probability
sij that is the probability from node i to j. Thus the row sum of matrix S is
∑N
j sij =
1. Note that the diagonal of matrix S(sii = 0) are all zeros meaning no switching
between i to i itself. Finally the vector ~λ is the vector of newly arrived population
at all nodes. Vector ~λ can be seen as the users outside the network being directed to
the nodes.

~P (t+ 1, 1) = ~λ+Diag(S)r(1− c) ~P (t, 1)
+
∑K
a=1 S
T (sii = 0)r(1− c) ~P (t, a) for a = 1
~P (t+ 1, a) = Diag(S)r(1− c) ~P (t, a) + r · c ~P (t, a− 1) for a > 1
It is easy to see such a steady state exist if any probability of leaving the system
ri(a) > 0 so that there is a proportion of population leaving the system. The popula-
tion newly arriving into the network is ~λ and is constant. The network will reach the
steady equilibrium if the product of population and proportions of population leaving
the system equals the newly coming population ~λ from outside.
Let such a non negative steady state be ~P ∗(a) for a = 1, 2, 3, ..., K. We shall have:

~P ∗(1) = ~λ+Diag(S)r(1− c) ~P ∗(1) +∑Ka=1 ST (sii = 0)r(1− c) ~P ∗(a) for a = 1
~P ∗(a) = Diag(S)r(1− c) ~P ∗(a) + r · c ~P ∗(a− 1) for a > 1
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Solve that
~P ∗(a) = [I −Diag(S)r(1− c)]−1r · c ~P ∗(a− 1)
=
a∏
k=2
{[I −Diag(S)r(1− c)]−1r · c} ~P ∗(1) for a > 1
In sum,
~P ∗(a) = f (a) ~P ∗(1) (2.1)

f (1) = 1 for a = 1
f (a) =
∏a
k=2{[I −Diag(S)r(1− c)]−1r · c} for a > 1
Let Φ =
∑K
a=1 S
T (sii = 0)r(1− c)f (a)
~P ∗(1) = ~λ+Diag(S)r(1− c) ~P ∗(1) + Φ ~P ∗(1)
Solve that
~P ∗(1) = [I −Diag(S)r(1− c)− Φ]−1~λ (2.2)
From the analytical solution of difference model, we find:
• Long term steady population ~P ∗(a) for a > 1 only depends on lone term steady
population at the first residences’ age bin ~P ∗(1), the aging proportion c, the
probability of exiting the system r and only diagonal elements of switching
matrix S.
• There is a fixed decaying factor [I − Diag(S)r(1 − c)]−1r · c from previous
residences’ age bin a− 1 to current residences’ age bin a (a > 1).
• Long term steady population at the first bin ~P ∗(1) linearly depends on newly
arrived population ~λ
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The simulation results of final population at each residence’s age bin and for every
node were presented in the section of sale-free network generation 2.2.1.
2.2.1 Harvesting Attention Function
We define the objective function Y , which represents the harvested attention used
to solve online problems or answer questions. It is a weighed summation of population
at each node across all age bins. Quantitatively objective function Y multiplying
length of age bin L is the total productive attention on the network we are interested,
but qualitatively because length of bin L is constant we focus on weighted population
Y on the network.
Y =
K∑
a=1
ωa
N∑
j=1
P ∗j (a) (2.3)
ωa is the weight for harvested utility from each age bin. The weights are computed
by a logistic function which gives 0 when age a is small and 1 when age a is approaching
the end. The weight value from logistic function is determined by mean parameter
A, steepness parameter b, and shape parameter v which are discussed in detail in the
section 2.4.
ωa =
1
(1 + A ∗ e−b∗a)v (2.4)
The idea of weight ωa takes into account of increasing utility of attention into
solving and value producing when people spend longer attention and time. While
more time is spent on the topic of interest, or the node, less people will stay on the
node because of lack of interest. Whoever stays longer is contributing more effectively
into knowledge production. Such dynamics are also explained in the figure 2.2.
14
Figure 2.2: Objective Function Diagram
Scale-free Network Construction
The World Wide Web and social networks are scale-free networks and follow charac-
teristic power law for distribution of edges, nodes, and degrees(Albert et al., 2000).
Particularly, Wu and Janssen (2015) suggests the mechanism of forming the network
of online communities. Furthermore, Stack Exchange is a mixing between preferen-
tial attachment and reversed preferential attachment. The concept of preferential
attachment is that the attractiveness of an existing node is positively related to its
degree. Under reversed preferential attachment, the attractiveness would be inversely
proportional to its degree. The best fitted mixing ratio between these two attachment
approaches on hundreds of Stack Exchange networks is 0.3 with 30% preferential at-
tachment and 70% reversed preferential attachment (Wu and Janssen, 2015). In this
section, we aim at constructing a scale-free network of mixing preferential attachment
and reversed preferential attachment based on empirical study and results Wu and
Janssen (2015) from over 110 different communities of Stack Exchange.
We first generate a finite network with N=100 nodes and then randomly assign
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degree to the initial nodes under power law distribution. Based on the assigned
degree, we further determine the number of connectivity for each node. As shown in
figure 2.3 and 2.4, the number of nodes and the connectivity of node follows power
law of the degree.
Figure 2.3: Degrees Distribution with N=100 Nodes
Given the best fitted ratio of mixing p=0.3 (Wu and Janssen, 2015), we use the
mixing scenario to determine the probability of a node is chosen to be connected and
the probability of a node at which users from outside the network arrive:
P (i) = p× ki∑N
j kj
+ (1− p)×
1
ki∑N
j (
1
kj
)
(2.5)
Where P (i) is the probability of choosing node i based on the degree of node ki.
At the node i, the number of connectivity KNNi is generated by power law.
KNNi also represents the number of edges coming out from node i. We randomly
determine where the edge is connecting to by the probability P (j) where j 6= i.
After connecting to the selected nodes, the switching out probability from node
i to node j(named as sij) among the connected nodes is standardized P (j) between
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Figure 2.4: Connectivity Distribution with N=100 Nodes
connected nodes. Thus sij = 0 if node i is not connected to node j. sij =
P (j)∑N
connectedl P (l)
when node i connected to node j and l is every connected node to the node i.
In the figure 2.5 below, it is the result of final steady state population at each res-
idence’s age bin decaying along the increasing age a. At each age bin, the population
is the total from all nodes.
17
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Age Bin (Length = 10 seconds)
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
Po
pu
la
tio
n
Total Population In The Network
Figure 2.5: Final Population Distribution across Residence’s Age Bins
Below in the figure 2.6, it is the histogram of final steady state population at each
node with population at each node as x axis and number of node with corresponding
population as y axis. As seen in the plot, 15 out of 100 nodes have populations near
50, the highest density point for population on a node. The highest number of final
population is close to 90 and lowest at 26.
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Figure 2.6: Histogram of Final Population at Each Node
2.2.2 Model Parameters
In this section, we discuss the methods of determining the parameter values. As
shown below at table 2.2, it lists all the parameters used to build the scale-free network
and model. In the Ref column, if it is stated as ”Assumed”, it is arbitrarily defined by
us. We will perform sensitivity analysis to explore the changing effect of all assumed
parameters in the model on the objective function Y of harvested attention. There
are a few parameters that we reference from previous literature(see table 2.2). The
rest were calculated. The section of calculation procedure is also cited in the Ref
column.
Table 2.2: Model Parameters
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Parameter Value Sensitivity Analysis Ref
λ Newly arrived population from outside 100 Yes Assumed
sij Switching probability 0 - 1 No Calculated2.2.1
r Probability of not exiting 0.98 Yes Assumed
c Aging factor 0.1 No Calculated 2.2
PL(a) Probability of leaving node 0 - 1 No Calculated2.7
λweibull Scale parameter of Weibull Distribution 20 Yes Liu et al. (2010)
kweibull Shape parameter of Weibull Distribution 0.8 Yes Liu et al. (2010)
p Preferential mixing ratio 0.3 Yes Wu and Janssen (2015)
ωa Weight of harvesting 0 - 1 No Calculated
A Logistic mean parameter 300 Yes Assumed
b Logistic steepness parameter 0.3 Yes Assumed
v Logistic shape parameter 2 Yes Assumed
Note arrived population from outside the network at each node i is λi = λ× P (i)∑N
i P (i)
.
The proportion P (i)∑N
i P (i)
is determined by property of the generated network. The
probability of users not exiting the network r is constant across age a and r = 0.98.
The probability of exiting the network at each residences’ age bin is 1− r = 2%.
Liu et al. (2010) found that dwelling time on 98.5% of webpages has negative
aging effect with shape parameter kweibull < 1. Shape parameter controls the prob-
ability increasing by time if kweibull > 1 or decreasing for kweibull < 1. The scale
parameter λweibull mostly falls within 400 seconds with 80 percentile at λweibull = 70
seconds. Scale parameter controls the mean of the Weibull distribution. In our study,
we set two parameter values(λweibull = 20, kweibull = 0.8) to configure the model. Note
that because we group every 10 seconds into one age bin, λweibull = 20 in our study
equivalent to λweibull = 200 in Liu’s research(Liu et al., 2010). The probability of
leaving a node at age bin a consists of probability of switching nodes from dwelling
Weibull distribution and probability of natural exiting out of the system. The differ-
ence of leaving probability PL(a) and exiting probability 1− r is the switching node
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probability Probswitch(a) and it is decaying by age.
Probswitch(a) =
kweibull
λweibull
(
a ∗ L
λweibull
)kweibull−1exp(−( a ∗ L
λweibull
)kweibull) (2.6)
PL(a) = 1− r + Probswitch(a) (2.7)
See figure 2.7 for the Weibull distribution curve of leaving probability PL(a) and
constant exiting probability 1 − r. Function PL(a) shows the same negative aging
curve in article2.
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Figure 2.7: Probability of Leaving the Node and Exiting the Network with Parameters
λweibull = 20, kweibull = 0.8 and r = 0.98
The harvesting weight ωa shall have two characteristics that when age a is close
to zero, weight ωa is close to zero and when age is increasing to one along age a, ωa
is getting larger. We use form of logistic function shown in equation 2.4 to generate
the weights in the figure 2.8 .
2”How Long Do Users Stay on Web Pages?”, Jakob Nielsen
https://www.nngroup.com/articles/how-long-do-users-stay-on-web-pages/
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A is the mean parameter which controls the sigmoid’s midpoint. b is the logistic
growth rate parameter which controls the steepness of the curve. v is the shape
parameter which decides how fast the curve is approaching to one.
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Figure 2.8: Harvesting Weights under Different Parameters and b = 0.3
2.3 Result
We first examine the result of sensitivity analysis. During the section 2.3.1, we
perform local one-at-a-time sensitivity analysis on eight assumed model parameters.
In the next subsection, we are interested in how the population dynamics in the
network changes while we reduce edges to switch out in the network.
2.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis
Given the objective function of Y in section 2.2.1, we look at the change of eight
model parameters in term of the objective function Y. The sensitivity coefficient
is defined as f = ∆Y/Y
∆x/x
where f is the sensitivity coefficient and x is the model
parameter. The change of parameter and objective value are ∆x and ∆Y .
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Table 2.3: Parameters Table for Sensitivity Analysis
Parameter Baseline Value Range Sensitivity Coefficient R2
λ Newly arrived population from outside 100 (50,500) 1 1
r Probability of not exiting 0.98 (0.95,0.999) 1201.4 0.344
λweibull Scale parameter 20 (10,30) -0.1654 0.989
kweibull Shape parameter 0.8 (0.5,0.99) 0.764 0.954
p Preferential mixing ratio 0.3 (0.01,0.6) −7.72× 10−17 0.0429
A Logistic mean parameter 300 (100,500) -0.7878 0.897
b Logistic steepness parameter 0.3 (0.1,0.5) 3.1976 0.933
v Logistic shape parameter 2 (1,3) -1.4017 0.857
In the table 2.3, we see probability of not exiting the network r is the most
sensitive parameter with coefficient value 1157 which means that increasing 1% of r
will cause 1201.4% increase on Y locally near the neighborhood of baseline parameter
set. Especially we can see from the figure of local sensitivity plot 2.9 that parameter
r has extreme nonlinear effect near the upper threshold when r increases close to
1. The non-linearity is caused by the population explosion when r = 1 meaning no
one will leave the network and the network will consistently grow. Both figures 2.9
and 2.10 provide the fitted linear curves to the simulated sensitivity coefficients of all
parameters studied in the sensitivity analysis with 95% confidence level.
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Figure 2.9: Linear Fitted Sensitivity Coefficients for First Four Parameters
The arrived population parameter λ shows perfectly linear trend in figure 2.9 with
R2 = 1 and coefficient 1. Increasing 1% of lambda will result in 1% increment of Y.
Scale parameter of Weibull distribution λweibull shows negative effect to Y because
when λweibull goes up, so as the mean of Weibull distribution and more likelihood of
switching in the later age. Compared less likelihood of switching in the early age but
more likelihood of switching in the later age, less portion of people will stay in long
and continuous focus to contribute into objective function Y when λweibull goes up.
Similarly for shape parameter of Weibull distribution kweibull, the larger the kweibull
is, the larger the steepness of the probability density curve of switching probability
therefore more likely the switching happens in the early age and less in the later.
Looking into three parameters controlling the weight distribution, we find logistic
function steepness parameter b has sensitivity parameter value of 3.1976. Increasing
b will lead the weight curve rise up earlier and gives higher weight to the early age.
Both of logistic mean parameter A and shape parameter v have negative sensitivity
coefficients because increasing the values of both will move the density curve of weight
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toward the right side. It means the weight for the early age will decrease and increase
for the later age. Considering the population of early age is the majority population
and the population of later age becomes minority, both parameters give negative
influences on final attention harvesting function Y.
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Figure 2.10: Linear Fitted Sensitivity Coefficients for Last Four Parameters
Finally, preferential mixing ratio p has a sensitivity coefficient value close to zero
and has non-linearity. It demonstrates p didn’t affect the value of attention harvest-
ing function Y significantly. Although preferential mixing ratio is critical parameter
to generate a scale-free network and to determine distribution of the newly arrived
population to each node, it does not impact the number of users exiting and distribu-
tion of population factors across the age f (a). Therefore the total population in the
network by age has no relationship with parameter p. It is only important to change
population traffic dynamic between nodes.
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2.3.2 Optimization of Edge Removal
In this section, we investigate the effect of distraction on attention spent at a
node. The research question we would like to answer is if by providing less distracted
options we improve productive attention being harvested on the network.
Firstly we assume when people facing less options to switch, they maintain the
same logic to make the rest of decision: staying, leaving the network or switching to
other nodes. We call this logic behind decisions as proportional distribution. Example
is given in the figure 2.11.
Given a connected network, a node is linked to other nodes. There is no trans-
portation to other node when there is no edge linked to others. The likelihoods of
users switching from node to node are different and governed by transmission matrix
Sij. We study the harvested attention Y and search for critical point if it exists which
will maximize the productive attention Y by removing edges other nodes. When re-
moving an edge from m to n at a node m, we assign the probability smn = 0 to
the removed edge and re-standardize the transmission matrix Sij so that row sum∑N
j sij equals to 1. The portion smnr(1− c) individuals who would choose and trans-
mit to node n from node m will now have another chance to make a decision about
switching nodes, staying or exiting the network. Then under the assumption that
the probability of switching to removed nodes would be proportionally distributed
between switching, staying and exiting. In figure 2.11 it is an example of removing
one edge from node 3 to node 1. The corresponding probability of switching to node
3 was proportionally distributed into events of switching to other nodes, staying at
current node and exiting the network.
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Figure 2.11: Conceptual Chart of Proportional Distribution When Removing a Node:
Black Arrows Are the Original Transmitting Probability. Red Arrows Are Addition-
ally the Probability from Removed Node 3 Added into Other Possible Directions.
p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 + p5 = 1.
By reducing the outflow degree of a node, we tend to model the users’ decisions un-
der less options and less distraction. We observe the final value of objective function
Y to see the change. The method of selecting which edge to remove is a standard ge-
netic algorithm with the goal of maximizing the the objective function Y by searching
across the network for the optimal edge. The standard genetic algorithm is imple-
mented in Matlab with built-in GA package and the code of model can be download
publicly3.
Figure 2.11 explain one concept of proportional distribution for the probability
of stitching to the removed node. Secondly we explain another concept of dispropor-
tional distribution. The idea is using an artifact parameter called stickiness factor to
3Matlab source code can be downloaded on CoMSES: https://www.comses.net/codebase-
release/dec749e7-3e8c-4dd2-a307-2d47db29297e/
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examine the desire to stay at current node when giving less options. Based on the
original proportion of switching, exiting and staying. Figure 2.12 gives an example.
We simulate and obverse the system under different values of stickiness factor shown
in the figure 2.13.
Figure 2.12: Conceptual Chart of Preferential Distribution When Removing a Node:
Black Arrows Are the Original Transmitting Probability. Red Arrows Are Addition-
ally the Probability from Removed Node 3 Added into Other Possible Directions.
p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 + p5 = 1. f is the Stickiness Factor Ranged from 0 to 1.
When stickiness factor f equals to 1, it is the same case of proportional distri-
bution. While f decreases, the people would have chosen to switch to the removed
node would now instead less likely to stay at current node but more likely to leave
the network or switch to other possible nodes. While we are perturbing the stickiness
factor f from 0.5 to 1, we see the maximum of objective function Y occurring at
different fraction of edges left in the network. Further decreasing stickiness factor f
to 0 will result in monotonic decreasing trend for objective function Y .
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Figure 2.13: Harvested Attention under Different Stickiness Factor from 0.5 to 1
In the figure 2.13, we present the harvested attention curve of objective function
Y for different stickiness factor f from 0.5 to 1 under edge removal. When f = 1
it is the case of proportional distribution for edge removal. The four lines of f = 1
,0.9, 0.8, and 0.7 show the objective function Y increasing at first and reaching the
maximum before decreasing when fraction of edges left after removal is decreasing.
If the likelihood of staying at the original node declines as f decreasing below 0.7,
there would be no increasing trend at the beginning of edge removal and the objective
function Y is always going down. By taking out the edges, our finding is that, based
on the value of stickiness factor f the network has different potential to maximize the
objective function Y.
In conclusion, when scale-free network has a high stickiness factor f ≥ 0.7, by
reducing the edges to certain degree we can maximize the harvested attention for
production Y . However if the network has low stickiness factor f < 0.7, there is no
gain to reduce the edges in the network. The optimal structure of the network is
depended on the stickiness factor f. As shown in the figure 2.13, the number of edges
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to remove before reaching maximum is positively related to the value of stickiness
factor f .
2.4 Discussion
The paper addresses the issue of competition for attention and overwhelming at-
tractive contents damping the concentration for knowledge production. Online com-
munity tends to provide variety of interesting choices to users in order to attract
visiting to the site. However, too much competition for attention results in frag-
mentation of attention and prevents consistent focus on solving difficult problems.
Also it discourages quality sequential computing happening. The work is replied on
empirical studies about network and user behaviors to quantify the attention being
harvested to produce answers and solution. We perform sensitivity analysis on model
parameters and find that the network structure has little impact on the overall quan-
tity of attention harvesting. Also the most sensitive parameter to the final quantity
of attention harvesting is the probability of exiting the network which has positive
local sensitivity coefficient of 1201.4.
We further investigate the dynamics of reducing distractions on the network by
removing edges between nodes. If users are more likely to leave the node when they
are given less options, the overall quantity of harvested attention will decline along the
edges removal on the network. If users remain the same way of thinking to make the
rest of decisions after edge removal, we see the harvested attention actually increases
before reaching the maximum and decreases afterward. The maximum of attention
is harvested, under the setting that stickiness factor f equals 1, when 20% of the
selected edges are removed from the original network. We use the stickiness factor
f to model the likelihood of staying at the original node after users are given less
choices. The threshold is f = 0.7 when harvested attention on the network would not
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benefit from edge removal. The finding brings insight and potential to optimize the
online community in order to encourage longer concentration and more attention to
produce knowledge.
This study has not yet considered various dimensions, complexity of the network
and user profile. In the future work, we would like to explore the difference in users
expertise, skill set, answering habits and strategies of pursuing reputation scores. As
we known, the heterogeneity of user attributes brings different dynamics into the
community and users contributes in very different ways. During the optimization of
the network to improve the quantity of attention harvesting, we have not yet studied
the characteristics of the selected and removed edges fro genetics algorithm. Given a
network, the condition of edges to remove remains as an open question. We would like
to investigate the connectivity of nodes with removed edges and explore the common
pattern of the optimal network structures if more time is permitted.
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Chapter 3
RETURN ON ASSETS OF ATTENTION HARVESTING FOR KNOWLEDGE
PRODUCTION
3.1 Introduction
There is a 72-hour video being uploaded to YouTube every minute1. We are facing
exploding amounts of content created while we are hardly able to digest it all. Human
attention is renewable but limited resource. It is critical that online users manage
their attention spent online in an efficient way. We study attention being used to
create knowledge on the online communities among many ways of online attention
harvesting. This process is also as known as crowdsourcing. People produce online
public good on the variety of topics and interests. In return they look for peer-
recognition, self satisfaction, prestige, others’ attention or other sources of benefit. In
out study, we focus on the crowdsourcing activity on the online Q&A communities.
Additionally, the model and methodology potentially can be applied on other online
behavioral problems. Knowing the value of those online knowledge created by people
is very insightful and helpful.
The goal of this study is to build a standard measurement for the efficiency of
online knowledge production on the online Q&A community. Our model helps to
provide insight of the gain and lost during attention harvesting into knowledge pro-
duction. We first summarize previous works on defining and quantifying conceptual
1”Multitasking: Focus and Dispersion in the Age of FOMO”, NURUN
https://www.nurun.com/en/our-thinking/emerging-behavior/multitasking-focus-and-dispersion-in-
the-age-of-fomo/
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terms related to online knowledge, specifically on the online Q&A communities. On
top of the defined metrics, we simulate attention spent on answering questions under
two typical online user behaviors on a virtual environment. We compute metrics like
quality of question and answers, value of question and answers, and percentage of
question answered.
Many studies contributed to quantify online knowledge (Huberman et al., 2009;
Anderson et al., 2012; Huna et al., 2016; Baltadzhieva and Chrupa la, 2015; Kavaler
and Filkov, 2018; Li et al., 2012; Ravi et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2013; Sun et al., 2018).
Estimating the value of online knowledge production is a challenging task. Anderson
et al. (2012) used data mining approaches on Stack overflow data to find the determi-
nants of the value of answers. Number of pageviews, in their study, is the measure-
ment for value of answers to a question. Pageviews is a good measurement because
it reflects the demand for the answer to the question and times of consumption. We
develop our form of value reflecting this popularity. Given observable variables like
the number of answers toward the question, total score of all answers and how long
the first answer arrives, Anderson et al. (2012) finds significant predicting power to
the number of pageviews a year later.
Several papers have addressed the quality of questions and found the determinants
of the questions’ quality(Li et al., 2012; Baltadzhieva and Chrupa la, 2015). For
example, Li et al. (2012) investigated the entertainment & music category of Yahoo!
Answers and gives distribution of the question quality in Movies and Musics sector.
In term of the quality of question and answers together, high quality question will
more likely to attract high quality answers and more attempts to answer(Baltadzhieva
and Chrupa la, 2015). Difficult questions get more quality answers as well based on
the behavioral study of answering (Wu et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2014). One popular
method of evaluating the answer quality is based on the ratio between answers scores
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and count of views (Kavaler and Filkov, 2018; Ravi et al., 2014).
The difficulty of a question can not be explicitly observed, however Huna et al.
(2016) approximated the difficulty with arrival time of first answer to a question.
Other approaches were also used to estimate the difficulty of a question (Liu et al.,
2013; Sun et al., 2018). Liu et al. (2013) gives an empirical distribution of questions
difficulty on the mathematics and computer science questions on Stack Overflow.
This distribution is an abnormal curve with two to five times more easy questions
than difficult ones.
We consider two typical online user behaviors as Wu et al. (2016); Yang et al.
(2014) characterized user behaviors into two main categories. In Yang et al. (2014),
one category is who answer popular and difficult questions and the other one is who
answer new and easy questions. Similarly Wu et al. (2016) classified all users into two
answering strategies of answering easy or difficult questions. Their empirical study
on different online communities showed the optimal mixing ratio is 63% of users
answering simple questions for substantial growth of the community. Furtado et al.
(2014) performed statistical clustering to find nine behavioral profiles using Stack
Exchange data. More importantly this study showed that skill level is negatively
associated with activity level and main contributors are more likely to be in the low
activity class than in the hyperactivist class. This is consistent with the result from
Yang et al. (2014).
3.2 Methods and Materials
3.2.1 Virtual Platform of Questions
Each question is represented as a basket with a width representing the question
quality and depth as the sequential computing difficulty. The total difficulty of a
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question is the product of width and depth. The width equals the number of bins in
the basket. For configuration of the question basket, see figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Concept of Question Answering and Question Difficulty
The number of bins reflects the quality of a question itself, which depends on how
well the question is defined, its appropriateness related to the general topics of the
community, and its tags. Li et al. (2012) investigated the entertainment & music
category of Yahoo! Answers and gave distribution of question quality in a range of
lowest 1 to highest 4. We generate the random variable Bq, the number of bins, based
on the empirical distribution from their study.
As such when there are more bins, the question is not very specific or clearly
stated. We define the question quality being lower when there are more bins like
Qualityq =
1
Bq
(3.1)
where Bq is the number of bin for question q.
Differently in our model, 1 represents the highest quality score with bin size one
and 0.25 is the lowest quality score with bin size four. A good quality question will
allow users to easily understand the problem, convert the meaning and concentrate on
one direction to derive an answer. So less bins means better quality of the question.
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The difficulty to solve a question can be defined as the product of the depth and
the number of bins.
Dq =
Depthq
Qualityq
= Depthq ×Bq (3.2)
Dq is the difficulty to solve a question q. Qualityq is the quality of question q
and Depthq is the depth of question q. In the example of figure 3.1, the quality of
question is 0.2 and the depth of the question is four thus the difficulty score would
be 20.
Bad quality question could be misleading and increase the difficulty to solve while
the true hardness of question itself could lay on the depth. Empirically the difficulty
can be approximated with the arrival time of first answer to a question(Huna et al.,
2016). Other approaches were also used to estimate the difficulty of questions from
Q&A community (Liu et al., 2013; Sun et al., 2018). We seem the study of difficulty
distribution can imply the distribution of depth in our model.
3.2.2 Derivation of Answers
Attention is harvested and used to produce answers. Attention is represented
by the red balls in figure 3.1. One unit of harvested attention equals to one red
ball, meaning the amount of attention needed to solve one simplest and best quality
question. Red balls are randomly placed in bins with equal likelihoods to solve a
question. Only when the number of consecutive red balls in one bin exceeds the
answer threshold, which is the depth of the question Depthq, then there is one answer
being successfully derived for the question. Similarly, multiple answers can be derived
if the total number of consecutive balls in bins exceed multiple times of threshold
Depthq. In figure 3.1, only one answer was given to the question and the rest of two
bins fail to derive an answer.
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The principle of how to throw balls into different question baskets varies bu user
types. We consider two typical users’ behaviors: only answering difficult questions
and only answering easy questions. The answer arrival time and the popularity of
questions are not considered in our model. We assume the difference on question
selection completely depends on the level of question difficulty. In our study, one
type of users Y1 are called difficulty lovers who prefer in answering difficult questions
and the others Y2 are called difficulty haters who prefer in answering easy questions.
Choice model is widely adapted to model online browsing and purchasing decisions
(Nair, 2010; Park, 2017). Here we use choice model to calculate the probability of
choosing a question q with difficulty score of Dq to answer given a user type. Let
indicator variable Kq = 1 indicate that question q was chosen and latent variable K
∗
q
indicate the potential utility from choosing question q. K∗q is purely determined by
question difficulty Dq.
For Y1 type users, K
∗
q is positively related to question difficulty Dq
K∗q|Y1 = α + βDq (3.3)
For Y2 type users, K
∗
q is negatively related to question difficulty Dq.
K∗q|Y2 = α− βDq (3.4)
where parameter α represents the random effect on decision with individual- and
time-specific variance and parameter β is the coefficient for difficulty. α = 0 would
suggest that no effect on individual difference and time variants when they are making
choice.
The probabilities of choosing question q P (Kq = 1|Y1) when given user type Y1
and P (Kq = 1|Y2) when given user type Y2 are:
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P (Kq = 1|Y1) = e
K∗
q|Y1∑Q
i e
K∗
i|Y1
(3.5)
P (Kq = 1|Y2) = e
K∗
q|Y2∑Q
i e
K∗
i|Y2
(3.6)
where Q is the total number of question.
3.2.3 Quality of Question with Answers
When the question is provided with answers, the total quality of question and
answers together is Uq.
Uq = Qualityq ×Depthq × Aq (3.7)
where Aq is the number of answers provided for question q. If no answer was
derived, Uq would be zero. This quality of answered question equation 3.7 captures
many features indicated in previous studies that high quality questions will more likely
to attract high quality answers and more attempts to answer so that it increases the
number of answers Aq(Baltadzhieva and Chrupa la, 2015). Thus Qualityq and Aq have
positive impacts on the quality of question and answers pair Uq. Difficult questions are
getting more quality answers as well based on the behavioral study of answering (Wu
et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2014). It is important to distinguish the different definitions
of difficulty in different studies. Wu et al. (2016); Yang et al. (2014) referred difficulty
as true sequential computing difficulty to solve a question. While in reality difficulty
to solve a question could due to bad quality question itself(no example, bad problem
statement, wrong tag, etc) and sequential computing difficulty. Here in our model
we consider the difficulty to answer a question comes from sequential computation
difficulty modeled as depth Depthq and question quality Qualityq. In term of quality
for the answers provided, one popular method of evaluating the answer quality is
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based on the ratio between answers scores and count of views (Kavaler and Filkov,
2018; Ravi et al., 2014).
Answers quality shall positively depend on the amount of attention and human
computing power used to solve the questions. Therefore Uq directly depended on the
number of balls in the basket Nq. Note that Depthq×Aq ≤ Nq. It is reasonable to use
Depthq ×Aq instead of Nq because if the same amount of attention spent on difficult
and easy questions, there will be more waste of attention from failed attempts. The
final quality of answers to an easy question would be higher if the amount of attention
used to answer is the same between easy and difficult questions.
The overall average quality of answered questions across the community is U¯ :
U¯ =
∑Q
q Uq
Q
(3.8)
Q is the total number of questions being answered across the community.
3.2.4 Return On Assets(ROA) Ratio for Answered Question
We define ROA as a way to measure the value gained from answering questions
by paying one unit of attention. The related features to the question’s value like the
total number of answers provided, the total score of the answers, the time for highest-
scoring answer to arrive, questioner’s reputation and number of questioner’s questions
are monitored and shown to be important in Anderson et al. (2012). Therefore in
our study, the value of answered questions with the corresponding answers Vq is
determined by the total number of answers Aq, total number of balls in the basket of
question Nq, and depth of question Depthq.
39

Vq = β1Nq + β2Aq + β3Depthq for Aq ≥ 1
Vq = 0 for Aq = 0
(3.9)
where β1, β2, β3 are linear regression coefficients. The estimate of Vq is only defined
when the questions have at least one successful answer. We define values for β1, β2, β3
based on estimations from other studies. From Anderson et al. (2012) the value of β1
equals to 0.83, which composes of regression coefficient for sum of answer scores 0.47,
regression coefficient for number of comments on highest-scoring answers 0.19 and
regression coefficient for number of comments on highest-reputation answerer’s answer
0.17, since the amount of attention spent on one question will reflect by the sum of
answer scores and number of comment. The value of β2 equals to 0.61, which means
the regression coefficient for the number of answers. Depth of a question contributes
to the difficulty of a question, the length of the best answers and the comments of
answers for sequential development of an answer thus β3 = 0.96, which is the sum of
regression coefficient for length of highest-scoring answer 0.38, coefficient of time for
highest-scoring answer to arrive 0.22, and coefficients for number of comments 0.36.
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Figure 3.2: Sensitivity Analysis of Question Values by Independently Varying Coef-
ficients β1, β2 and β3 Values Up and Down 20%
Using distribution of number of answers and number of balls from simulation,
question value is plotted in the figure 3.2 with question ID as x axis value and question
value as y axis value. In fact, coefficients β2 and β3 are insensitive to the question
value while coefficient β1 has only minor effect on value for most popular questions
as shown in figure 3.2. Changing curves from coefficients β2 and β3 is too identical
to original curve to be clearly observed.
The Return On Asset(ROA) of attention harvesting on an answered question q is
ROAq =
Vq
Nq
= β1 +
β2Aq + β3Depthq
Nq
(3.10)
The overall ROA for the community ¯ROA can be computed as
¯ROA =
∑Q
q Vq∑Q
q Nq
(3.11)
Q is the total number of questions being answered across the community.
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3.2.5 Simulation Algorithm
Simulation algorithm proceeds as flowchart 3.3 presents. Total attention, modeled
by total number of balls in the system M is the sum of attention from both of type
Y1 and type Y2 users, namely difficulty lovers and difficulty haters. Total number of
balls M is a model variable to study. Other variables to study are rd, a proportion of
difficulty lovers type Y1 among all population, and preferential coefficient of difficulty
β in equations 3.3 and 3.4. At the beginning of simulation, system sets up three
variables M , β, and rd along with other constant parameters listed in table 3.1. Next,
probabilities of balls assigned to each question by user types are discussed in previous
section. After the assignments of balls to questions, we individually model the ball
placement in the question basket that balls are randomly falling in different bins with
even likelihoods. Finally, we summarize the metrics and compare contributions from
two types of users.
42
Figure 3.3: Flow Chart
3.3 Result
We simulate two identified answering strategies on the virtual community of ques-
tions and answers. We perform three special case studies 3.3.1,3.3.2 and 3.3.3 by
varying one of three study parameters at a time. The parameter values used as base-
line model, are listed in the table 3.1. The specific variations, made during special
case studies, were explained in the corresponding subsection.
Table 3.1: Model Parameters
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Parameter Value Case Study Ref
N Total number of questions 1000 None Assumed
M Total number of balls 5000 3.3.1 Assumed
rd Proportion of difficulty lovers Y1 0.37 3.3.2 Wu et al. (2016)
β1 Regression coefficient for attention draw 0.83 None Anderson et al. (2012)
β2 Regression coefficient for number of answers 0.61 None Anderson et al. (2012)
β3 Regression coefficient for question depth 0.96 None Anderson et al. (2012)
α random effect on decision 0 None Assumed
β coefficient for difficulty 1 3.3.3 Assumed
The question quality was generated in four different levels based on the empirical
result from Li et al. (2012) with 1 as the highest value of quality score for the question
and 0.25 as the lowest. Four possible values for quality of question are 0.25, 0.33, 0.5,
and 1.
Depth is generated by an approximation introduced in Liu et al. (2013) from 1-100
scale into 1-7 scale. Depth represents the true sequential computing difficulty of a
question.
In the figure 3.4, the top left plot shows the histogram of question difficulty dis-
tribution. Most of the question is easy to medium level. At the top right of figure
3.4, we present the quality of answered questions and the corresponding contribu-
tion of balls from two separate user types, who are in favor of answering difficult
questions and who are avoiding answering the difficult questions. As it shown, both
types of answering behaviors contribute to high-quality questions and answers but
difficulty lovers are contributing more to achieve the same level of high quality than
difficulty haters. The plot at bottom left also shows the similar trend but in term
of value created for question and answers. Although difficulty lovers are the con-
tributors for high-value and high-quality questions, their ROA scores are lower than
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difficulty haters, which means that they didn’t utilize their attention as efficient and
profitable as difficulty haters. Solving difficult questions requires more attention and
effort, which drives difficulty lovers to spend more on difficult questions to achieve
the same level of quality and value as for the easy questions. In the bottom right of
figure 3.4, slightly lower ROA scores for questions with high number of balls means
that, difficulty lovers spend too much attention on answering difficulty questions and
these overly answered questions have lower ROA scores. If attention was put in other
higher ROA questions, more value could be created.
Figure 3.4: Distinct Patterns of Contribution by Two Users Types
3.3.1 Case Study 1: Variant Number of Balls
We increase M , the number of balls thrown per simulation, from 1000 to 40000.
We see the percentage of questions being successfully answered increased as well as
the overall average quality and value of an answered question. In the figure 3.5, the
trends of three mentioned metrics match with our expectation, while the plot at the
bottom right shows the ROA ratio is approaching to a steady level after a sharp
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increase.
Figure 3.5: Dynamics of Increasing Number of Ball Participating(Blue Solid Line for
the Average across the Community and Orange Dot Line for the Median across the
Answered Questions)
The increase of answering percentage is nonlinear and is slowing down with a
smaller slope. The orange dash line is the median value among answered questions
and the blue solid line is the average value across the whole community. At the bot-
tom right of figure 3.5, we see the median of ROA among all answered questions is
decreasing. While we increase the total number of balls, the marginal value per an-
swer from answered questions decreases to a steady level and less number of questions
are unanswered. Median value of ROA is decreasing until an equilibrium was reached
between newly answered questions with higher ROA scores and overly answered ques-
tions with ROA scores lower than 1. The overall average ROA shown in blue line lays
in average ROA scores between two sets of questions, easy ones and difficult ones.
Average ROA is lower than the median value of ROA in orange because of the balls
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wasted into unanswered questions.
3.3.2 Case Study 2: Variant Ratio between Difficulty Lovers and Difficulty Haters
In the second case study, we look into the mixing ratio of difficulty lovers rd in
a population. By changing the proportion of balls for difficulty lovers from 0.1 to 1,
we assign the balls thrown by difficulty lovers from 10% of the total number of 5000
balls to 100%. While we are increasing the proportion of balls for difficulty lovers,
the balls left for difficulty haters are decreasing correspondingly.
Figure 3.6: Dynamics of Changing Ratio between Difficulty Lovers and Difficulty
Haters(Blue Solid Line for the Average across the Community and Orange Dot Line
for the Median across the Answered Questions)
The percentage of questions being answered was decreasing in figure 3.6 while the
total number of balls thrown by difficulty lovers increasing. Answering strategy is
narrowing down to the minority of the questions with high difficulty and difficulty
lovers don’t contribute as much as the difficulty haters to the general question with
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easy to medium level of difficulty. Also the value and quality of the questions are
slightly decreasing toward the end and have a jump when rd = 1. At the point of
rd = 1, the number of answered questions quickly slumps because of insufficient balls
for general easy questions. Thus the questions answered are all by difficulty lovers
and all the balls contribute to high difficulty questions. High concentration of ball
distribution on a few highly difficult question when rd = 1 causes a soaring value
and quality among those highly difficult questions. However, the number of questions
being answered dropped to lowest. In term of efficiency, we see from the bottom right
in figure 3.6, that average ROA in orange color is decreasing when we are increasing
the proportion of difficulty lovers. The median of ROA value across the questions
being answered was increasing before approaching to the end, meaning that difficult
answered questions have higher average ROA in general compared to easy answered
questions. When approaching to the extreme state of rd = 1, we see the average and
the median of quality, value and ROA jump to the level of difficulty lovers cluster.
3.3.3 Case Study 3: Variant Preferential Coefficient of Difficulty β
Preferential coefficient of difficulty β in equations 3.3 and 3.4 is measuring how
much the users value the difficulty while making decision to pick questions. Higher the
coefficient β is, the more distinguished difference between the likelihoods of choosing
highly difficult questions and very simple questions is. If β equals to zero, then it
means that choosing a question is random and the difference in difficulty was not
considered.
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Figure 3.7: Dynamics of Changing Difficulty-based Coefficient b(Blue Solid Line for
the Average across the Community and Orange Dot Line for the Median across the
Answered Questions)
As the bottom left and top right of figure 3.7 shown, increasing the coefficient β
will result in more attention paid in very difficult and very easy questions while this
increase is scarifying the overall percentage of questions answered. The difficulty level
of questions being answered is heading toward two extreme cases that either they are
very tough or they are very simple. In average, quality and value are both slightly
increasing. The average ROA is also slightly increasing meaning that, less balls have
been wasted on the failure of producing answers.
3.4 Discussion
This project aims at measuring the efficiency of paying attention to answer ques-
tions, and analyzing contributions from different answering preferences in the diffi-
culty level. We compute a Return On Assets(ROA) ratio to measure the profitability
of attention used into creating value of question and answers by dividing the overall
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value of answered question with total attention quantified as the number of balls in
the question basket. Our algorithm simulates a virtual community under two identi-
fied and typical answering behaviors from Yang et al. (2014); Wu et al. (2016) which
are interested in only difficult questions or only easy ones. More attention harvested
results in higher average quality and value of a question and higher percentage of
question answered. Three case studies find that the preference of answering difficult
questions will have a lower efficiency of value creation. On the other hand, focusing
on answering easy questions not only will significantly benefit overall percentage of
questions being answered, but also show potential for improvement on overall effi-
ciency. In this study, the limitation of our work is that the users dynamics and other
preferences of user behaviors are not in the scope of our research. Only considering
two answering behaviors are a simplified assumption for general user behaviors. This
study is lack of the dynamics from other users types and collaborations between user
types. Behaviors are simulated at a whole community level in our model. We are
unable to study time factor and individual interaction. In the next project, we will
further expand the study of user attributes and capture individual behavior.
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Chapter 4
HOW BEHAVIOR OF USERS IMPACTS THE SUCCESS OF ONLINE Q&A
COMMUNITIES
4.1 Introduction
In ecology diversity of species plays a critical role to maintain ecosystem’s struc-
ture and function. It is known that ecosystems with less diversity are fragile(Elmqvist
et al., 2003). Species variety as a measure of system’s robustness is a characteristic
not only seen in ecology, but also in artificial systems like online communities as an
analogy between diverse user behaviors on the online community and different species
in an ecosystem. In Q&A online communities participants volunteer their time to an-
swer questions. What makes Q&A online communities productive, meaning that a
large number of their questions are answered in a satisfying way so that communities
are beneficial in long term? This will depend on how participants channel their at-
tention among the many different open questions. The conflict between information
overload and scarcity of attention has been addressed by scholar for a long time (Si-
mon, 1969; Eppler and Mengis, 2004; Lanham, 2006). The Q&A online communities
is a practical example where effective challenging the attention of the community
could lead to important community benefits.
In this paper we will use an agent-based model to explore the relationships be-
tween the diversity of behavioral strategies of agents on the performance of the Q&A
community. This will help us to understand how incentive structures could impact
the outcomes of Q&A communities. Studies on Q&A communities (Furtado et al.,
2014; Yang et al., 2014; Samala, 2015; Wu et al., 2016; Fang and Zhang, 2019; Wang
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et al., 2018) identified and analyzed users’ contributions, participation, answering
strategy, and expertise to find distinct users groups. The difference between groups
characterizes and emphasises on their different favors of difficulty and popularity on
the questions to answer(Wu et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2014).
A large population scale study Hong and Page (2004) has shown that the more
diverse a population is, the better capability of problem solving, compared to popu-
lation of best-performing agents. However, there is little focus on what diversity of
these user classes brings to the growth and accomplishment of online crowdsourcing
community like Stack Overflow so that such online community becomes robust. Early
work Alsina et al. (2015) measured the diversity as variation of the tenure of active
users and compared to the score for answers across the community. Wu et al. (2016)
showed a proper mixing ratio of strategy between answering difficult and easy ques-
tions helps the community to thrive. In this work, we analyze how decisions made at
the individual’s level can be captured and transformed into measures of the overall
success of Q&A communities. Specifically we look into how the users’ question se-
lecting and answering strategies impact community’s performance. This challenging
task of aggregating and understanding emerging collective behavior and individual
variability has also been pointed as a critical challenge in ecological problems (Levin,
1992).
In order to accomplish that, the first step is to set up a framework or environ-
ment with proper spatial and temporal scales and interaction mechanisms. Based on
quantified factors from Liu et al. (2013); Li et al. (2012); Baltadzhieva and Chrupa la
(2015); Ravi et al. (2014); Huna et al. (2016); Sun et al. (2018), we develop a virtual
environment of users participating in question answering activity on online community
with distinct user behaviors and attributes observed in Wu et al. (2016); Anderson
et al. (2012); Huberman et al. (1998); Kavaler and Filkov (2018); Yang et al. (2014);
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Furtado et al. (2014).
With stochastic simulation and statistical interference, we explore the different
contributions from each type of user group under their dynamic interactions. We
further assess contributions by overall coverage of questions being answered, average
quality and value of solved answers and accomplishment of average question difficulty
on the community. Reaching and improving the above four criteria are the objectives
we think online Q&A communities may want to accomplish. There are potentially
many other ways to assess community’s goals. Focusing on various objectives to
community’s success, we explore an multi-dimensional surface of feasible outcome
under co-effect of question selecting and answering strategies. Our sensitivity analysis
on these complex surfaces gives insight about how the owners and organizers of the
Q&A community shall make trade-off on leverage to achieve objectives. This research
also discovers relationship between question selection strategy and answering strategy
and shows diversity of strategies crucial to achieve different objectives. Our study
provides the groundwork to further studies on analyzing alternative designs for the
development of the Q&A communities.
4.2 Model
The model describes the interaction of Nuser agents with M questions. First we
describe the construction of a virtual environment of questions including the definition
of question quality, difficulty and answer formulation for a question in the subsections
of previous chapter 3.2.1 and 3.2.3 for the quality of question and answers together.
A virtual platform of questions consists of many baskets representing questions and
new baskets will be constantly added into the environment. However, we assume
there is no removal for the old questions. Thus the platform of questions is growing
thought simulation time.
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When a user spends attention on the question, the attention spent is modeled
as balls placed into bins. All agents are assumed to randomly throw balls into the
basket. An answer to the question is given when a bin reaches the answer threshold
(see figure 3.1). Since a user throws balls randomly, more bins and higher thresholds
require more effort to get answers to question.
Secondly we model users’ activities on the virtual community described in 4.2.1.
All users will have the same expertise level and the same amount of attention to
contribute to the virtual environment. The model will explore how, given a limited
amount of attention, different strategies to select and answer questions will impact
the overall development of a Q&A community. At last, in the subsection 4.2.4 we
illustrate steps to set up simulation and algorithm of simulation.
4.2.1 Diverse User Strategy
Each user selects questions to answer. Each user is assumed to have two impor-
tant attributes which determine the strategies of which questions (s)he selects and
how (s)he pays attention to answer those. Question selection strategy controls the
preference in questions screening and picking potential questions to answer. After
a user selects a number of questions to answer, how the user spends attention and
focus to answer each question is governed by question answering strategy which de-
termines the preference in answering which question first and last as well as how
much attention and energy shall be used on trying to answer each question. In the
following two sub-subsections we further illustrate the details of question selection
strategy and question answering strategy. In the model we also assume independence
between selecting preference and answering preference since, to our knowledge, there
is no study showing there is correlation between two behaviors.
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4.2.2 Question Selection Strategy
Users select a number of questions to consider to answer. The selection of this
set of questions depends on the preference of the agent how to select. In Yang
et al. (2014) one category of agents is owls (who prefer selecting popular and difficult
questions to answer) and the other type of agents is sparrows (who are in favor of
selecting new and easy questions). Classification of strategies about question selection
preference for simply tasks versus challenging tasks is also adopted in Wu et al. (2016).
During our study, we focus on two question characteristics: popularity and difficulty.
We consider five independent strategies of question selection which are named easy,
difficult, popular, new and random. Random strategy represents no preference. We
assume users in the study independently belong to only one category of five, although
in the reality users may have a mix of different strategies. The difficulty Dq (3.2) can
be approximated by ratio between the number of answers and number of views in the
reality(Huna et al., 2016). If users have a preference to select difficult questions, the
probability of a question q being picked Probqdifficult by user is positively based on
and ascended by absolute level on question difficulty Dq.
Probqdifficult =
Dq∑Q
i Di
. (4.1)
Q is the total number of available questions. If users have a preference to select
easy questions, the probability of questions being picked by user Probqeasy is based on
and descended by ranking on question easiness, the reciprocal of difficulty score.
Probqeasy =
1/Dq∑Q
i 1/Di
. (4.2)
In our model, the number of views equally compares to the number of trials for
balls Nq. Basket depth Depthq and bin number Bq, which difficulty Dq (3.2) composes
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of, determines the likelihood of answering. A difficult question will have low ratio of
answers per view. The nature of a question like sequential computing difficulty level
and its own quality has been generated under distribution discovered by Li et al.
(2012); Baltadzhieva and Chrupa la (2015); Liu et al. (2013).
In realistic environment the number of views for a question and answers can
approximate popularity from both answer seekers and question answerers. Here in
our model we make assumption that the popularity of a question from selecting to
answer is positively related and in same proportion to popularity of a question from
answer seeking. Therefore, the number of balls in the basket represents the popularity
of a question in our model under such assumption. It can be seen by everyone while
selecting the questions to answer. The probability of questions being picked is based
on and descended by absolute values on question popularity for users in preference of
popular questions and reversely depended on popularity scores for users not in favor
of popular questions but new questions. If users have a preference to select popular
questions, the probability of a question q being picked Probqpopular by user is positively
based on and ascended by absolute level on number of balls in the question basket
Nq.
Probqpopular =
Nq∑Q
i Ni
. (4.3)
The probability of a question q being picked Probqnew by user in favor of selecting
new questions:
Probqnew =
1/exp(Nq)∑Q
i 1/exp(Ni)
. (4.4)
We use exponential function exp() to scale up the difference on weights between
number of balls and do not need to worry the denominator becomes zero for a prob-
ability of selecting new questions.
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For those in random category of question selection strategy, users will even likely
and randomly choose from all questions. The probability of selecting any question q
from random strategy user Probrandom:
Probqpopular =
1
Q
. (4.5)
4.2.3 Question Answering Strategy
Given a pre-selected question set, a user will answer questions in a way determined
by question answering strategy. Due to the issue of fragmentation of attention, it is
normally the case that a user would not be able to pay long and continuous attention
to solve questions especially for difficult questions requiring intense focus. We propose
three answering strategies: ”until one answer”, ”evenly”, and ”ROA”.
”Until one answer” strategy is the most ideal case that user is able to prevent
any distraction and concentrate on solving the question until (s)he derives an answer.
The order of question answering is random.
We stochastically distribute attention or balls with equal probability among all
selected questions which is the answering strategy of ”evenly”. The order of question
answering is random.
At last, we propose a value estimation approach for questions and answers. This
provides a measurement for gain on paying attention to answer called ROA (Return
On Assets). Details of value estimation approach and calculation of ROA are given in
the appendix 3.2.4. If a question has no answer, we can not compute ROA value and
ROA will be defaulted to zero. The strategy of ”ROA” will stochastically distribute
attention based on ROA scores of all selected questions so that a higher ROA question
will likely get more attention and also more likely be answered first. The likelihood
of a question receiving attention is depended on the ROA score of a question. This
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strategy tends to manage attention allocation and answering priority under the guide
of ROA score so that users maximize the creation of value from answering.
Figure 4.1: Structure of User Profile
In summary both ”evenly” and ”ROA” answering strategies gives maximum num-
ber of balls available to throw for each selected question. If assigned balls for each
question run out, user will move to the next question until all balls are thrown or
all selected questions are answered. If one answer is successfully derived, the remain-
ing balls for the question will be added into the pool of assigned balls for the next
question.
4.2.4 Model Flow Chart
In this section we describe the model of the whole system, namely how the gen-
eration of questions and answering of questions are connected. In Figure 4.2, a flow
chart is presented that depicts the flow of actions during the simulation. For details
about the parameter values and variable definitions we refer to the appendix B.1.
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Figure 4.2: Flow Chart
At the start of a simulation we generateNinitialquestion empty questions baskets with
bins and depth. Initial number of questions Ninitialquestion is set to 10 for our model.
Increasing or decreasing the value of this variable Ninitialquestion will not change long
term dynamics but affects the speed of approaching saturation stage. A small value
will create too much stochasticity at the early stage and a large value will slow down
saturation speed. Number of bins and depth of the question basket are generated
from empirical distribution from similar study on Q&A communities (Li et al., 2012;
Liu et al., 2013). Quality of questions modeled as basket bin in our study is found
to follow a gradually decreasing probability from low quality to high. Distribution of
sequential computing difficulty modeled as basket depth is not normally distributed
and has a very light tail toward difficult end. Then we start a sequence of steps that
are repeated till the end of the simulation. We generate a user and assign attribute
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A and B from user profile figure 4.1 to the user. This represents a user entering
the space of questions during a certain time interval of interest. The user is defined
by attributes A and B. With independent drawings those attributes are assigned.
Percentage of each category is variable as we will explore in the model analysis the
consequence of different distribution of attribute types. Based on attribute A the user
will select the questions to answer. Based on attribute B a strategy is used to allocate
the attention to answer the selected questions. Details of both are discussed in the
previous subsections 4.2.1. We update the metrics how questions are answered, such
as the number of questions successfully answered, calculate the value of the answered
questions, the ROA and quality from user’s contribution. We then add one new
question into the community with a fixed rate of question introduction at each time
step. Its number of bins and depth follow the same distribution as before. It is a new
empty basket. If we are not at the end of the simulation we will continue with the
next user.
4.2.5 Simulation Scenarios and Standards for Community Performance
First we discuss what determine the success of a Q&A community. Percentage of
questions being answered on the community is good evaluation metric but it does not
reflect the quality of answers and how likely it satisfies the asker’s need. Let Q be the
total number of questions in the observed simulation period and Qs be the number
of questions with at least one answer among all Q questions. The first standard Ps
is evaluated by:
Ps =
Qs
Q
. (4.6)
Quality of answers(computation explained in appendix 3.2.3) shall be considered.
In our model it is partially reflected by the number of answer provided to the question.
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The second standard Q¯A is given by:
Q¯A =
∑Qs
i QAi
Qs
. (4.7)
where QAi is the quality of answers and question together for question i and
question i must be answered already.
Naturally if a question is newly posted and attracts little attention and interest,
having high quality answers to the question will not bring too much benefit as social
good for the society. Ideally we want popular issues being addressed with high quality
answers first than less interesting questions. A value estimation approach has been
proposed in appendix 3.2.4 to quantify the long term value of one question and its
answers. We consider this as another important statistical metric to look into while
evaluating the success of a community. The third standards V¯ is computed as:
V¯ =
∑Lw
i Vi
Lw
. (4.8)
where Lw is the window size of question selection and defines the total number
of questions that user can select to answer. It is set to 5 during our simulation. Vi
is the value of answers created for question i. The definition of value Vi can refer to
equation 3.9 in the appendix 3.2.4. If the question has no answer yet, the value is
defaulted to zero.
Beside all of above standards, we believe on the community level, ability of solving
difficult task is crucial as well. Research Wu et al. (2016) pointed out this ability
increases the competency for online Q&A community, attracts more people to visit
and increases more questions being asked. The average difficulty among all D¯ is
important metric to value competence of community as part of standard to success.
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D¯ =
∑Qs
i Di
Q
. (4.9)
Di is the difficulty level for question i. Only answered questions will be considered
into calculation of average difficulty thus it is different than the average difficulty of
all questions on the community.
In conclusion, we look into four standards: percentage of questions being answered,
average quality of answered questions, average value of selected questions and average
difficulty of answered questions in our simulation as measurements of success.
Regardless of initial condition, whole simulation environment in term of average
percentage of questions being answered will enter saturation stage after a warming up
period when a balance between the newly arriving users and newly created questions
forms. On average the percentage of questions being answered reaches a steady level
when approaching to saturation stage shown in figure 4.3. We compare performance
between scenarios and strategies after saturation. After examining the system and
simulation result, we find sufficient warming up period is 50 time steps and all the
results are collected from 51 to 150 time steps to guarantee the process reaches the
steady stage. Since we introduce one user and one question per time step, Equally
speaking, we stop simulation after we introduced the 150th user.
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Figure 4.3: The Mean Percentage of Question Answered among 2000 Simulations:
Black dots for One Simulation at One Time Step and Blue Line for the Simulation
Mean at Each Time Step
The model parameters in the table B.1 are fixed across all simulations result shown
in the main paper. We also study a few special and extreme cases that we change one
or two parameter values from the table. The purpose of those special studies is to
better understand and demonstrate model characteristics. Most of the results from
special cases are in the appendix. The parameter values we are varying are clearly
explained in the context.
We have five preference categories for question selection strategies: easy, difficult,
popular, new and random. Category ”random” can be alternatively replaced by a
special case of equally mixing between categories ”easy” and ”difficult”. We show
such difference is trivial in the appendix B.2. This is one of the special simulation
study that we perform to compare dynamic difference. We eventually only consider
four question selecting strategies: easy, difficult, popular, and new for this part of
question selection strategy simulation.
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Disregarding the effect of random question selection strategy, categories easy and
difficult can be named together as group of difficulty-biased no matter they are in
favor of easy questions or difficult ones. New and popular categories can be named
together as group of popularity-biased. For our interest of study, we present results
for these two groups of popularity-biased and difficulty-biased in subsection 4.3.1.
We conduct sensitivity analysis on mix of categories for different scenarios(defined in
table 4.1) to explore the effect of group size on shaping the surface of variant propor-
tion of mixture between difficulty-biased and popularity-biased groups. Dynamics of
answering strategy is not within our scope, thus three answering strategies are equally
and randomly assigned to users with probabilities in the table B.1.
We use a variable ratiox to represent the ratio between group size of popularity-
biased and difficulty-biased. For instance if ratiox = 0.8 that means 80% of whole
simulated user population is falling into the group of popularity-biased and the rest
20% belongs to group difficulty-biased. The baseline scenario is when ratiox = 0.5
and no group of random question selection, then we have equal population in groups
of popularity-biased and difficulty-biased. Popularity dominated scenario is when
ratiox = 0.8 and difficulty dominated scenario is ratiox = 0.2 without users of random
question selection strategy. Proportions of three group for three scenarios are listed
in the table 4.1. In reality, user group with identifiable behavior and preference is
only a small portion and majority of users is behaving close to random strategy and
no clear preference. Yang et al. (2014) finds two identified groups, the owls (who
are experts and provide instructive answers to difficult and popular questions) and
sparrows (who are highly active on the community, having a high reputation score
and likely answering new and easy questions to accumulate the reputation scores),
are no more than 23% of the total studied population on Stack Overflow. But they
together make more than 87% answers. Therefore, the difficulty dominated scenario
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is closer to the mixture in the reality while the majority of users from difficulty-biased
group has no preference in choosing between easy and difficulty questions which act
approximately like 50% in easy and 50% in difficult as we demonstrate before.
Table 4.1: Three Scenarios Setting
Scenarios Proportions between three groups [Random, Popularity, Difficulty] ratiox
Baseline scenario [0, 0.5, 0.5] 0.5
Popularity dominated scenario [0,0.8,0.2] 0.8
Difficulty dominated scenario [0,0.2,0.8] 0.2
4.2.6 Simulation Dynamics of Selection Strategy and Answering Strategy
At last, we look into dynamics of question selection strategy and answering strat-
egy together. We have five question selection strategies and three question answering
strategies. In total, we have 15 different combinations of selection-answering strategy
pair. The first glance of the extreme cases, which only have one pair of selection-
answering strategy on the whole virtual Q&A community, gives us ideas and insights
about general behaviors of different pairs. Among 2,000 simulations, the average of
number of answers, average increment of value and average increment of quality from
each individual user are recorded and compared to 15 extreme cases.
More interesting, we would like to see how different strategies interact and collab-
orate on the virtual community. The second simulation framework has equal propor-
tions of all question selection strategies and answering strategies. So speaking, the
likelihoods of having selection strategies for random, easy, difficult, new and popular
are all 20% and the likelihoods of having answering strategies for ”Evenly”, ”Until
One” and ”ROA” are 33%, 33% and 34% respectively. Note that the assignment
between selection strategy and answering strategy is independent.
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We compare different answering strategies under different question selection strate-
gies to find how one answering strategy will be more productive and suitable to an-
other question selection strategy. Across 2,000 simulations we collect the mean of
each estimation result under different combinations of answering strategies and se-
lection strategies at each time step of simulation after time enters saturating stage.
Results of 15 extreme cases with one single pair of selection and answering strategy
and another simulation result with all possible pairs are in subsection 4.3.3.
4.3 Result
4.3.1 Dynamic of Mixture in Question Selecting Strategies
Let X be the proportion of users in the difficulty-biased group in preference of
easy questions. Let Y be the proportion of users in the popularity-biased group in
preference of popular questions. The conceptual chart of baseline scenario is presented
in figure 4.4. For the other two scenarios, the group sizes of difficulty-biased and
popularity-biased changes but the definition of variables X and Y remains the same.
Variables X and Y are independent and are varied throughout simulations.
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Figure 4.4: X Is the Proportion of Users in the Difficulty-biased Group in Preference
of Easy questions. 1 − X Is the proportion of Users in the Difficulty-biased Group
in Preference of Difficult Questions. Y Is the Proportion of Users in the Popularity-
biased Group in Preference of Popular Questions. 1 − Y Is the Proportion of Users
in the Popularity-biased Group in Preference of New Questions
In convenience of computation and result presentation, different values of vari-
able X defines horizontal line of x axis which stands for the proportion of users in
preference of selecting easy questions to answer from difficulty-biased group. Differ-
ent values of variable Y defines vertical line as y axis stands for the proportion of
users in the preference of selecting popular questions to answer from popularity-biased
group. We separately vary and sample variables X and Y from 11 discrete points
[0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1]. Discrete point 0 on y axis means no users
has favor in new questions and 100% users in the group of popularity-biased are in
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favor of popular questions. Similarly discrete point 0 on x axis means no users has
favor in easy questions and 100% users in the group of difficulty-biased are in favor of
difficult questions. Every discrete value of X has been coupled with different values
of Y . We run 2,000 times simulation on each pair of different combination between
X and Y . Mean of all simulation metrics among 2,000 simulations will be shown
on 11 by 11 grid. We identify the maximum value per row and run t-test(normality
tests satisfied) with significant level 0.05 to see how different compared to the row
maximum the neighbor values along x axis would be. In detail the figures of results
for different scenarios are given in the appendix B.3.1, B.3.2 and B.3.3.
In the following graphs 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7, all the lines connect to different shapes
to show an optimal path determined by row maximums respectively for four different
standards. Detail about optimal path can be referred in the appendix B.3.1. Lines
indicate the optimal path that maximum values among horizontal axis moved along y
axis, the proportion of preference in popularity. Circle indicates the global maximum
point for average percentage of questions being answered. Star indicates the global
maximum point for average value of questions being selected to answer. It is calcu-
lated as the total value gain from one user divided by the total number of questions
selection. Maximizing the average value of questions being selected is the same as
maximizing the total value of all selected questions gained from one round of user
activity. Triangle indicates the global maximum point for average quality of questions
being answered. Square indicates the global maximum point for average difficulty of
questions among all questions in the community with difficulty level of unanswered
ones defaulted to zero. It is computed as the average difficulty level among all solved
and unsolved questions. Unanswered questions will have zero difficulty score. It cap-
tures the dynamics from question answering coverage and average level of difficulty
among all answered questions.
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Figure 4.5: Row maximum paths and global maximum points between different
standards for popularity dominated scenario (80% of popularity-biased and 20% of
difficulty-biased)
Figure 4.6: Row Maximum Paths and Global Maximum Points between Different
Standards for Baseline Scenario (50% of Popularity-biased and 50% of Difficulty-
biased)
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Figure 4.7: Row Maximum Paths and Global Maximum Points between Different
Standards for Difficulty Dominated Scenario (20% of Popularity-biased and 80% of
Difficulty-biased)
First thing to tell from all figures is that direction from right to left and from top
to bottom maximizes the average percentage of questions being answered, average
value created and average difficulty of answered questions for all three scenarios.
Intuitively increasing the proportion of preference in new questions will maximize the
average percentage of questions being answered. If there is enough coverage from
users group in favor of new questions, easy questions will quickly and more likely be
solved already than difficult ones. Thus more demand to answer difficult questions is
needed. Orange circle is moving toward left to increase the proportion of preference in
difficult questions when the proportion of preference in popular questions decreases.
Direction toward up right maximizes the average quality of answered questions.
Global maximum point reached at 100% of population in preference in answering
popular questions, because average quality of answered questions on the community
directly depends on number of answers per question. More attention is spent on
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solved and popular questions instead of unanswered and new ones will increase the
number of answers per answered question. Therefore, more population in preference
in answering popular questions, average total number of questions being answered
decreases but number of answers per question increases. Easy questions require less
attention to solve so if same amount of attention is put on difficult questions instead of
easy questions, there will be less number of answers given to the questions. Therefore
you can observe green line, which indicates the maximum path for average quality
of answered questions always laying on right side at the point of 100% proportion of
preference in easy questions.
Next, average value creation from selected questions moves in the similar way as
average percentage of answered questions because only one answer can be given to
one question by every user. In order to maximize the average value creation, strategy
needs to maximize the total value created from answering selected questions. Value
is only created when new answer is provided to question. It is the same goal as
maximizing percentage of answered question. Thus the overall behavior of optimal
path and movement toward global maximum point is similar to average percentage
of answered questions.
In term of average difficulty of answered questions, 100% proportion of users in the
group of difficulty-biased shall only focus on answering difficult questions to maximize
the average level of difficulty. That is why the optimal path for average difficulty is
laying at the left side border. One thing to point out is that calculation of average
difficulty of answered questions is using total number of questions on the community
to divide accumulated difficulty score from all answered questions. Ideal maximization
strategy is to solve questions in priority of question difficulty. Global maximum point
achieves when 100% proportion of users in the group of difficulty-biased chooses
difficult questions and 100% proportion of users in the group of popularity-biased
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chooses new questions.
The maximum paths of average quality of answered questions and average diffi-
culty of answered questions were not affected by different setting of three scenarios.
However, for average percentage of answered questions, more portion of difficulty-
biased group squeezes the path along x axis, the proportion of preference in easiness,
to tighter and sharpens the slope of the path along y axis, the proportion of prefer-
ence in popularity. Similar stretching and squeezing effect are also observed in term
of average value creation from selected questions. For the difficulty dominated sce-
nario, both global optimal points of average value creation and average percentage
of answered questions move away from left bottom corner and reach at 0.1 and 0.2
respectively. The interesting twisting and bending is due to the inequality of popu-
lation size between two groups of difficulty-biased and popularity-biased. Presenting
this dynamics of interaction and collaboration between this inequality group setting
is one purpose of our simulation study.
All the analysis and results are based on heat maps on the discrete grid shown
in figures B.3, B.6, B.4 and B.5 for baseline scenario. We perform analysis and
interpretation for dynamic behavior around global maximum values. Figures B.7,
B.9, B.8 and B.10 show corresponding analysis for the popularity dominated scenario
and figures B.11, B.13, B.12 and B.14 show corresponding analysis for the difficulty
dominated scenario.
4.3.2 Objective of Community Development
In this sub-subsection, we provide a potential implication of our finding about
question selection strategy to evaluate different standards of community achievement.
We compute the weighted score between all standardized scores of different standards.
During the last sub-subsection we look at four standards to quantify the overall
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performance of different question selection strategies on the community. If we give
equal weight to each standard and plot the equally weighted score of four standards
on the proportion map of difficulty and popularity, we produce the following contour
plot figures B.15, 4.8 and 4.9.
Figure 4.8 shows contour map of equally weighted score of four standards: aver-
age percentage of questions being answered, average quality of answered questions,
average value of questions selected and average difficulty of questions on the com-
munity. x axis is the proportion of population selecting easy questions to answer in
the difficulty-biased group. y axis is the proportion of population selecting popular
questions to answer in the popularity-biased group. The weighted objective score
decreases along the y axis, the proportion of preference in popularity, toward more
proportion of population selecting popular questions. We find the proportion of popu-
lation selecting between easy questions and difficult questions does not affect the final
objective score. Only population in preference of selecting new questions to answer
is needed and ideal. The lighter area indicating the highest weighted score lays along
the x axis of the proportion of preference in easiness and at the bottom of the low
proportion of preference in popularity. The least attracting area in darker ink is when
all population in the popularity-biased group is selecting only popular questions and
all population in the difficulty-biased group is selecting only the difficult questions.
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Figure 4.8: Contour Map of Equally Weighted Objective Score for Baseline Scenario
Among four standards, average value created from selected questions is the least
sensitive one. Standardized score for average value of questions selected varies from
0.9 to maximum value 1. Thus the weight changing do not affect the overall contour
map greatly for average value of selected questions. Average percentage of ques-
tions being answered and average difficulty of questions are the most sensitive two
standards. That is why the maximum area from the contour map is dominated by
the direction toward bottom left which is the maximizing direction of both average
percentage of questions being answered and average difficulty of questions. Only for
the average quality of answered questions, the maximizing direction of top right is in
favor. The final weighted score of four standards on the contour map 4.8 shows the
most attracting area is when no more than 10% population from group of popularity-
biased is interested in selecting popular questions to answer while the mixture within
group of difficulty-biased between choosing difficult questions or easy questions to
answer does not impact the overall weighted score. Similar dynamic and observation
can be found for the popularity dominated scenario and the contour map B.15 is
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shown in the appendix.
However, for the difficulty dominated scenario we will see the contour lines no
longer close to linear. In fact, we see nonlinear contour lines shown in graph 4.9
and extreme mixing proportion in the group of difficulty-biased(the proportion of
preference in easiness close to 1 or 0) is no longer desirable.
Figure 4.9: Contour Map of Equally Weighted Objective Score for Difficulty Domi-
nated Scenario
Under the difficulty dominated scenario, majority of population is from the difficulty-
biased group. Only 20% of whole population is from popularity-biased group. The
proportion of mixing for difficulty-biased group becomes sensitive to the proportion
of mixing for popularity-biased group. The maximum area in light color and contour
lines in figure 4.9 is bending up depended on the distribution of question difficulty and
interactions between selection strategies. In this case of scenario, diversity along the
question selection between difficult questions and easy ones becomes very crucial to
improve overall community performance. It is ideal to maintain a balanced mixture
of population between preference in easiness and in difficulty at least when no more
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than 80% of participants from popularity-biased group is concentrating on answering
popular questions only.
Given different weight to each standard will certainly change the contour lines
and maximum area. After all, equally weighting contour map is one example of im-
plementation of sensitivity surface we explore with simulation and modeling. Long
term goal for online community shall determine weight assignment for each evaluation
standards. With certain weight combination, diversity of preference in easiness and
difficulty may or may not be encouraged and optimal area could in favor of only one
selection strategy between easy and difficult questions. If weight of average quality
of questions answered is dominated, only selection strategy in easy questions is the
attractive approach. While weights of average percentage of questions answered and
average difficulty of questions answered are dominated, only selection strategy in diffi-
cult questions is ideal to use. Along y axis, the only optimal strategy is always 100%
selecting new questions to answer. Including other different metrics as evaluation
standard will also change the dynamics of contour map including maximum area and
contour lines.
4.3.3 Finding about Pairing Different Answering Strategies with Ideal Question
Selection Strategy
As we discussed in the sub-subsection 4.2.6, we observe outcomes from 15 extreme
cases with single binding between selection strategy and answering strategy. The
mean value is averaging the stochasticity of environment and dependence on previous
state. The time series of the means are depending on the structure of question profile
and both of individual answering strategy and selection strategy taken at the time
step. Structure of question profile remain the same across all simulations thus the
comparison on mean and variance of time series shall not be differentiated because of
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structure of question profile. The final observation values shown in all figures are the
mean of time series across 100 time steps from time point 51 to time point 150. 25 and
75 percentiles are captured and shown in red error bars. The variances of observation
values stand for the variances of mean from 2,000 simulations and variance of question
profile.
First, we look into average number of answers produced by individual user in the
figure 4.10. Answering strategy of ”ROA” produced greatly less number of answers
when pairing with selection strategy of new. That is because ”ROA” answering
strategy always prioritizing(first answer and assign more attention to answer) question
with large depth which is more difficult to answer only when the number of balls Nq
in all question baskets is relatively small. When the number of balls Nq in all question
baskets is relatively large and depth of question no longer dominates the ROA value
of a question, ”ROA” answering strategy tends to prioritize easy questions which
have higher ROA values. That is why ”ROA” answering strategy produced the most
number of answers under selection strategy of popular. Answering easy question will
generally create less value than getting an answer for a difficult question. This can be
seen particular from the figure 4.12 that ”ROA” answering strategy create the least
amount of value under popular question selection strategy. All answering strategies
under both easy and difficult question selection strategies are correspondingly getting
similar amount of value even though the number of answers under easy question
selection strategy is more.
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Figure 4.10: Average number of answers per individual user of 15 independent and
extreme cases with single pair of selection and answering strategy and bar errors are
25th and 75th percentiles.
Figure 4.11: Average Increment of Quality per Individual User of 15 Independent and
Extreme Cases with Single Pair of Selection and Answering Strategy and Bar Errors
Are 25th and 75th Percentiles.
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Figure 4.12: Average Increment of Value per Individual User of 15 Independent and
Extreme Cases with Single Pair of Selection and Answering Strategy and Bar Errors
Are 25th and 75th Percentiles.
Overall, ”Until one” answering strategy is the best strategy to take and the second
best is ”Evenly” answering strategy. However, you will see during strategies inter-
action and collaboration in the following experiment, the least interesting answering
strategy ”ROA” becomes the second best answering strategy in term of average num-
ber of answers in figure 4.13 and average increment of quality in figure 4.15.
Next, we are not varying any model parameters but only observing the effect and
performance of pairing between selection strategies and answering strategies. The
setting of this focus study is using equal group size between five selection strategies:
20% of random, 20% of easy, 20% of difficult, 20% of popular and 20% of new.
So speaking every user will have equal likelihood to adapt any one of five selection
strategies. As for the answer strategy, it is equally distributed with 33% likelihood for
”Evenly”, 33% likelihood for ”Until One” and the rest of 34% likelihood for ”ROA”.
The observation values are not normally distributed because of impact from ques-
tion profile structure. We perform one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on all se-
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quences of observation values. Null hypothesises, that the data in comes from a stan-
dard normal distribution, are rejected for all cases with confidence level α = 0.01.
Instead we use Mann-Whitney U-test, which has less assumption on the sample dis-
tribution, to examine the difference between group means instead of traditional t-test.
Test results from Mann Whitney U-test imply the group mean differences between all
pairs are statistical significantly different with all p values less than 0.001 expect for
four cases. The exceptional cases are when question selection strategies are new and
popular, group mean difference between ”Evenly” and ”ROA” answering strategies
are insignificant for number of answers and increment of quality. p values from Mann-
Whitney U-test for number of answers between ”Evenly” and ”ROA” are 0.0089 and
0.2051 respectively under new and popular selection strategies. p values from Mann-
Whitney U-test for increment of quality between ”Evenly” and ”ROA” are 0.2647
and 0.9659 respectively under new and popular selection strategies.
Figure 4.13: Average Number of Answers from Three Answering Strategies under
Five Different Question Selecting Strategies with 25 and 75 Percentile Bars
In term of average number of answers being successfully produced to the selected
questions, we observe that answering strategy ”ROA” is producing more or equivalent
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number of answers than ”Evenly” answering strategy for all selection strategies while
”Until One” is still the most productive answering strategy. Answering strategy
”Until one” is outperforming because it better utilizes the residual of balls in the
basket which are contributed by previous users but fail to form an answer. Ball
residual is plotted in the bottom figures 4.14 by popularity level and 4.16 by difficulty
level. Questions with top 25 percentile on difficulty level have been classified into
difficult group with dot. Questions with bottom 25 percentile on difficulty level have
been classified into easy group with triangle. The questions in between are called
medium with circle. Shown in bottom figure 4.16, 25% of questions have depth less
than or equal to 3 and contribute to majority of easy questions(difficulty level less
than 15). The other 25% of questions have depth larger than or equal to 5 and widely
reside in easy and difficult level. The rest of 50% of questions have depth of 4 and
have difficulty level below 16. In summary, a difficult question(difficulty level larger
than 16) must have a large depth. However an easy question could be a question
with large depth but good question quality(less number of bins in the basket) or with
small depth.
Shown in upper figure 4.14, all questions with high popularity have the same level
of ROA scores and the difference between ”ROA” and ”Evenly” answering strate-
gies becomes small because of dependence on ROA value of ”ROA” strategy. It
explains when selecting questions with high popularity, answering strategies ”ROA”
and ”Random” is very close in producing number of answers because of similar ROA
level among popular questions. When selected questions are new, ROA socre will
most likely be defaulted to zero due to no answer provided. If all new questions have
zero ROA scores, ”ROA” answering strategy acts like ”Evenly” to evenly distribute
upper amount of balls to every question.
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Figure 4.14: ROA and Balls Residual Plots along Popularity Level by Three Classes
of Depth
Based on comparison on number of answers from figure 4.13, we can interpret the
result of quality increment in figure 4.15 that more number of answers means more
increment of quality. In average the question itself quality and depth is in the same
level across all three answering strategies. In upper figure of 4.16, we can tell different
difficulty levels and depth levels do not have differentiated level of ROA scores.
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Figure 4.15: Average Increment of Quality from Three Answering Strategies under
Five Different Question Selecting Strategies with 25 and 75 Percentile Bars
Figure 4.16: ROA and Balls Residual Plots along Difficulty Level by Three Classes
of Depth
At last we look into the plot of value increment 4.17 between selection strategies
and answering strategies. Value of questions depends on number of answers, atten-
tion to the question and answers or its popularity, which we modeled it as number
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of balls in the basket during our study, and the depth. Unlike quality of question,
which is the product between number of answers, depth and quality of question itself,
value of question has linear and addable relation between each components. Detail
of computation equation can refer to appendix 3.2.4. In configuration, first answer
to the question claims a bonus on value related to the depth of question besides the
value collected from the answer itself and attention to solve the question. Such dy-
namics is rewarding to the strategy which can most likely solve unanswered questions
and that answering strategy is ”Until one”. While ROA for the new questions de-
faults to zero, answering strategy ”ROA” ranks the new questions last to solve and
increases the upper limits of attention used to solve questions with positive ROA
scores. ”ROA” answering strategy has the least chance to claim the bonus of being
first answer to question while ”Until one” answering strategy has the best chance to
provide first answer to unsolved questions. Such tendency is reflected on the value
increment plot 4.17 that ”Until one” is the best answering strategy given all selection
strategies. ”ROA” answering strategy is the worst scenario expect for the case that
question selection strategy is new. When all selected questions are new, ”ROA” an-
swering strategy behaves the same as ”Random” answering strategy. However, given
the situation of new questions mixing with questions having ROA scores, ”ROA”
answering strategy prioritizes questions with answers and ROA scores and allocates
resource more efficiently to answer easy questions first(from upper figure 4.14). Given
that most of selected questions are new without answer, efficiency and prioritization
from ”ROA” answering strategy provide slightly more number of answers to create
more significant value than ”Random” answering strategy which evenly allocates the
resource to solve all selected questions.
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Figure 4.17: Average Increment of Value from Three Answering Strategies under Five
Different Question Selecting Strategies with 25 and 75 Percentile Bars
In summary, first important point to make is that ”ROA” answering strategy
works better when collaborating with other answering strategies than with itself as
we see big improvement on number of answers and quality increment from ”ROA”
answering strategy. Such improvement is caused by diversity of ROA scores and
selected questions on the community shaped by diversity of question selection and
answering strategies. While lack of diversity of selected question, dynamics of balls
residual plays an important role to attract attention to answer with higher ROA score
but relatively more difficult to answer due to the reason that newly answered question
will have lower balls residual but higher ROA score.
Secondly, value increments and number of answers are all increased for ”Until one”
answering strategy except under new question selection strategy in the environment of
diverse selection and answering strategies. It can be explained that diverse strategies
create more balls residual. ”Until one” answering strategy is effectively collecting the
residual to form more answers. It is also true that implementation of single selection
strategy and ”Until one” answering strategy on the community can more effectively
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solve questions with large depth so that quality increment from extreme cases with
”Until one” is larger except for selection strategy of difficult. As mentioned before
from bottom figure 4.16, difficult question must all have large depths(at least more
than 4). If selected questions are all difficult, there are no distinguishing different
on the depths between questions so ”Until one” answering strategy will create more
quality under the environment of diverse selection and answering strategies due to
more number of answers.
Finally, under the environment of diverse combination of different selection and
answering strategies ”ROA” answering strategy is at least better than ”Evenly” strat-
egy on value increment and no worse than other two metrics when paring with new
question selection strategy.
4.4 Conclusions
In the case of difficulty dominated scenario, we shows question selecting strategy
of new is always preferred to popular after equally balancing all main community ob-
jectives and it would be optimal to have slightly more proportion of users in preference
of selecting easy questions than selecting difficult ones. This finding of optimum area
falls inline with empirical observation of group mixture from Stack Overflow under
effect of its reputation rewarding mechanism. However, we discover that under other
different mixtures of question selection groups community performance metrics could
change dramatically. For instance, for the case of popularity dominated scenario,
optimal mixture for average value of answered questions given proportions of users
selecting popular and new questions has very steep slope of change and a jump with
discontinuity near the point that 30% of users selecting popular questions and the
rest of 70% users from the popularity-biased group is selecting new questions. The
simulation result suggested the reputation rewarding system adapted by Stack Over-
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flow is driving the community to a direction of improving overall successes. Some
very active users under this rewarding system are pursing high reputation scores by
looking for new and easy questions to answer and they are referred as sparrows(Yang
et al., 2014).
While paying continuous attention until question is solved or time runs out is
the best answering strategy among all, in the reality it is hardly achieved because
of fragmentation of attention. Under the existing of diverse question selection and
answering strategies, the second best answering strategy is allocating attention to
solve questions based on ROA scores of questions if the goal is to improve overall
quality of answered questions on the community and total number of answers to the
questions. Moreover it is also true for improvement of overall value, particularly when
users is selecting new questions to answer as primary selection strategy. We discover
the limitation of answering strategy ”ROA” which is short of answering coverage for
unsolved questions. The created value from ”ROA” answering strategy is lowest in
general even if it aims to maximize it because ROA scores sometimes are misleading
and not reflect the dynamics of uncertainty.
The model makes arguable independence assumptions between question selecting
strategies, answering strategies and answering order from question to question. On
the real Q&A community, these independence may not be valid. In fact Yang et al.
(2014) shows roughly 10%-22% of sparrows also belong to the set of owls. So speaking,
User could adapt more than one selecting strategies and answering strategies. While
there has no evidence to find dependent relationship or connection between question
selection preference and answering behavior either as far as we know. Next, questions
are linked to questions by relatedness and shared asker. Network of questions has
been heavily studied. In the future work we would like to incorporate such study and
discuss how the underlying network structure of questions changes the overall dy-
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namics and result. Adding the question network structure will fundamentally change
the affect of question selection strategy. It will also impact on the implication of
answering strategies. Other potential work can be discussed is related to cost-effect
analysis on changing mixture of question selection strategy.
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Figure A.1: Average Number of Answers Derived from Three Different Strategies at
Each Time Step with Original Simulation Setting of 15 Balls on Hand
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Figure A.2: Average Additional Quality Created from Three Different Strategies at
Each Time Step with Original Simulation Setting of 15 Balls on Hand
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Figure A.3: Average Additional Value Created from Three Different Strategies at
Each Time Step with Original Simulation Setting of 15 Balls on Hand
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B.1 MODEL PARAMETERS
Variable Nuser defines how many users will enter the system and play the game.
It also equals to the simulation time step since only one user enters the system at a
time. Variable rnewquestion is how many new questions entering the system at each time
step. Variable Ninitialquestion controls how many new questions exist when the first
user arrives. In a long term, this value shall not affect the overall dynamics. Variable
Lw determines how many questions to be selected and be prepared for answering.
Early work of page to page surfing and clicking by Huberman et al. (1998) gave the
probability distribution of number of links. The most portion of frequency of clicks
are below five.
Table B.1: Fixed Parameters for Simulation
Fixed Parameter Value
Nuser Total number of users 150
rnewquestion New question generating rate per user 1
Ninitialquestion Initial number of questions in the
game
10
Lw Window size of questions selection 5
Probbin Probabilities of number of question bins
[1,2,3,4]
[0.221,0.2927,0.2608,0.2256]Li et al. (2012)
Probdepth Probabilities of question sequential com-
puting difficulty [2,3,4,5,6,7]
[0.125,0.25,0.3125,0.125,0.125,0.0625] Liu et al. (2013)
Nsim Number of iterations per simulation configu-
ration
2000
β1, β2, β3 Regression coefficients for value compu-
tation
[0.83,0.61,0.96] Liu et al. (2013)
pB Probabilities of being in answering preference
[”evenly”, ”until one answer”, ”ROA”]
[0.3,0.3,0.4]
Variables Probbin give probabilities of number of bin for 1,2,3 and 4 based on Li
et al. (2012). Variables Probdepth give probabilities of question sequential computing
difficulty or the depth for 2,3,4,5,6 and 7 based on Liu et al. (2013). Variable Nsim
defines the number of iterations during one simulation. All the results are the mean
values across all iterations. Parameters β1, β2, β3 are discussed in 3.2.4 and are
regression coefficients for value computation. Variable pB gives the proportion of
three categories of attribute B.
B.2 INDEPENDENT STUDY OF RANDOM QUESTION SELECTION
The purpose of this section is to show that the random question selection strat-
egy has similar effect and results as the group with half-half mixing proportion of
strategy between selecting easy and difficult questions. We demonstrate variant on
the proportion of users who are doing random question selection brings trivial change
compared to a population with half-half mixing question selection strategy between
selecting easy and selecting difficult questions. Thus the strategy of random question
selection can be approximated by a single group of difficulty-biased with half in pref-
erence of selecting easy questions and the other half in preference of selecting difficult
questions.
In here, again we use the notations of variables X and Y in the experiment of
comparison which is different from those in the main paper. Let X be the proportion
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of the users randomly selecting questions in the whole population. Let Y be the
proportion of users in group of difficulty-biased. Further Y1 and Y2 be the proportion
of users among all users in favor of easy questions and difficulty questions respectively
in the group of difficulty-biased. Therefore,
X + Y = 1
Y = Y1 + Y2
Y1 = Y2 = Y/2
We vary X from 0 to 1 and take 9 discrete points in between with equal space.
ThenX ∈ [0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1] and Y ∈ [1, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1, 0].
When X = 0 it means there is no group of random question selection and 100% users
are coming from the group of difficulty-biased. WhenX = 1 it means there is no group
of difficulty-biased and 100% users are coming from the group of random question
selection. The mean of questions answered percentage, average quality and average
value across all questions on the community among 2,000 simulations are shown in
figure B.1.
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Figure B.1: Comparison of Variant on Random Question Selection (Bars Show One
Standard Deviation Ranges)
We see very trivial change from extreme case of 100% users from group of difficulty-
biased(X = 0) to another extreme case of 100% users from group of random question
selection (X = 1) in the figure B.1. Next we are looking closely into ball distribution
among questions between two extreme cases X = 0 and X = 1.
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Figure B.2: Comparison of Extreme Cases: All Randomly Selecting and All Difficulty-
biased with Half and Half Mixing
By taking mean on number of balls in each question basket among 2,000 simulation
runs we show in the figure B.2 there is no significant difference in ball distribution
between two extreme case of x = 0 and x = 1. Each circle and cross in the figure B.2
represent one mean value for one question from two different settings. The case of
x = 0 has no user from group of random question selection and half of population is
in favor of easy questions and the other half in favor of difficult questions. The case
of x = 1 has users who only randomly select questions to answer.
B.3 SIMULATION RESULT FOR QUESTION SELECTION STRATEGY
B.3.1 BASELINE SCENARIO
We look at the percentage of questions answered on the community for baseline
scenario which is half population of difficulty-biased and the other half of popularity-
biased. As shown in figure B.3, with a circle we mark the maximum value at each
row. For instance at the first row if all users in the group of popularity-biased are in
favor of new questions only, then the best outcome is having 80% of users from group
of difficulty-biased preferring easy questions and the rest of 20% preferring difficult
questions. We perform One-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to examine normality
of all 2,000 simulation results and make sure they are normally distributed. Then
along each row we run two samples t test for data with maximal sample mean (in
circle) and others to draw significant difference thresholds (between lines) with p value
0.05. Every box of mixture with p value less than 0.05 shall be included within the
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lines. Every box of mixture outside the lines are considered to be significant lower
than optimal value. The area with values between lines forms a optimal path along
y axis.
Figure B.3: Proportion Grid of Question Answering Percentage for Baseline Scenario
(50% of Popularity-biased and 50% of Difficulty-biased) with Red Circles for the
Maximum per Row and Red Lines for the Statistic Insignificant Bond between Two
Samples (p > 0.05)
Clearly the maximum value on the heatmap B.3 is 0.8412 at the left bottom
corner meaning when half of users only selecting new questions and half of users only
selecting difficult questions, the overall percentage of questions answered reaches the
maximum point 84.12%. Along the circles and between the lines we see an optimal
mixture path from top right to bottom left. More users are selecting new questions
to answer, higher the percentage of questions answered is. The optimal proportion of
users in preference of easiness decreases with increasing number of users in preference
of new questions because easy questions are more likely to be addressed already once
they are introduced into the system when more users are selecting new questions
to answer. We will see similar trend of moving toward bottom left across all three
scenarios.
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Figure B.4: Proportion Grid of Average Value for Baseline Scenario (50% of
Popularity-biased and 50% of Difficulty-biased) with Red Circles for the Maximum
per Row and Red Lines for the Statistic Insignificant Bond between Two Samples
(p > 0.05)
For the average value in the figure B.4, optimal mixture path is toward bottom
left with a very steep shifting while there is a small portion of users in favor of new
questions (y from 0 to 0.3 in the graph B.4). It seems that there are no need of users
in favor of easy questions when there are enough people in favor of new questions. It
is similar result as trend of question answering percentage.
Next we present the heatmap for average difficulty of answered questions in figure
B.5. Obviously more users selecting difficult questions to answer, higher the average
difficulty will be for all answered questions. Heatmap shows one dimensional dynamics
as heatmap for average quality B.6. In order to achieve the maximum of average
difficulty all in the groups of difficulty-biased shall choose only difficult questions
disregarding the mixing proportion in the group of popularity-biased.
100
Figure B.5: Proportion Grid of Average Difficulty for User Groups of Popularity-
biased and Difficulty-biased with Red Circles for the Maximum per Row and Red
Lines for the Statistic Insignificant Bond between Two Samples (p > 0.05)
At last in figure B.6 in term of average quality of answered questions the maximum
value is at the top right corner. In order to have a higher average quality, questions
need to accumulate answers. Depth of answers per question scarifies board coverage of
questions for answering so best mixing proportion is to have the most people selecting
popular questions and easy questions. Such pattern is the same across three scenarios.
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Figure B.6: Proportion Grid of Average Quality for Baseline Scenario (50% of
Popularity-biased and 50% of Difficulty-biased) with Red Circles for the Maximum
per Row and Red Lines for the Statistic Insignificant Bond between Two Samples
(p > 0.05)
We compare the results to difficulty dominated scenario and popularity dominated
scenario. Moving direction of optimal mixture paths for both are unchanged as we
analyzed above for the baseline scenario. The difference is the optimal mixture paths
for average percentage of questions answered and average value of questions answered
are steeper and sharper changing from one end to another for difficulty dominated
scenario with more people in the group of difficulty-biased. For the popularity dom-
inated scenario the change is more gradual in the heatmap of question answering
percentage and average value.
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B.3.2 POPULARITY DOMINATED SCENARIO
Figure B.7: Proportion Grid of Question Answering Percentage for Popularity Dom-
inated Scenario with Red Circles for the Maximum per Row and Red Lines for the
Statistic Insignificant Bond between Two Samples (p > 0.05)
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Figure B.8: Proportion Grid of Average Quality for Popularity Dominated Scenario
(80% of Popularity-biased and 20% of Difficulty-biased) with Red Circles for the
Maximum per Row and Red Lines for the Statistic Insignificant Bond between Two
Samples (p > 0.05)
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Figure B.9: Proportion Grid of Average Value for Popularity Dominated Sce-
nario(80% of Popularity-biased and 20% of Difficulty-biased) with Red Circles for
the Maximum per Row and Red Lines for the Statistic Insignificant Bond between
Two Samples (p > 0.05)
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Figure B.10: Proportion Grid of Average Difficulty for Popularity Dominated Sce-
nario(80% of Popularity-biased and 20% of Difficulty-biased) with Red Circles for the
Maximum per Row and Red Lines for the Statistic Insignificant Bond between Two
Samples (p > 0.05)
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B.3.3 DIFFICULTY DOMINATED SCENARIO
Figure B.11: Proportion Grid of Question Answering Percentage for Difficulty Dom-
inated Scenario (20% of Popularity-biased and 80% of Difficulty-biased) with Red
Circles for the Maximum per Row and Red Lines for the Statistic Insignificant Bond
between Two Samples (p > 0.05)
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Figure B.12: Proportion Grid of Average Quality for Difficulty Dominated Scenario
(20% of Popularity-biased and 80% of Difficulty-biased) with Red Circles for the
Maximum per Row and Red Lines for the Statistic Insignificant Bond between Two
Samples (p > 0.05)
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Figure B.13: Proportion Grid of Average Value for Difficulty Dominated Scenario
(20% of Popularity-biased and 80% of Difficulty-biased) with Red Circles for the
Maximum per Row and Red Lines for the Statistic Insignificant Bond between Two
Samples (p > 0.05)
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Figure B.14: Proportion Grid of Average Difficulty for Difficulty Dominated Scenario
(20% of Popularity-biased and 80% of Difficulty-biased) with Red Circles for the
Maximum per Row and Red Lines for the Statistic Insignificant Bond between Two
Samples (p > 0.05)
Figure B.15: Contour Map of Equally Weighted Objective Score for Popularity Dom-
inated Scenario
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